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Abstract
Modeling and Analysis of Value-Based Healthcare Delivery
by Tannaz Mahootchi
Doctor of Philosophy in Operations and Supply Chain Management
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY
Dr. Ignacio Castillo, Supervisor
Dr. Logan McLeod, Co-Supervisor
Healthcare reforms are emerging in order to control the increasing healthcare
expenditures and to improve the health outcomes. In the context of the “Value-
based Healthcare Delivery” reform, Michael Porter defines value as a patient’s
health outcome per dollar spent. Porter’s proposal is comprised of organizing care
around a medical condition (or around patient segments for primary care). Specif-
ically, care will be provided by a dedicated, multidisciplinary team of providers,
an Integrated Practice Unit (IPU). The IPU is jointly accountable for the health
outcomes of patients and the costs of providing care during the full cycle of care.
The main objective of this dissertation is to use analytics to determine enabling
factors for the successful implementation of the value-based healthcare delivery
reform. This dissertation consists of three core chapters.
Chapter 2 draws insights on the effects of current payment schemes, including
fee-for-service, capitation, and pay-for-performance, in fulfilling the objectives of
value-based healthcare delivery. Particularly, a mathematical representation of
healthcare delivery is proposed to assess if any of the existing payment systems can
incentivize providers to improve the quality and integrate the care simultaneously.
The results provide insights on strengths, shortcomings, and applicability of each
payment system in fulfilling value-based healthcare delivery objectives.
Chapter 3 determines the optimal payment system between the healthcare pur-
chaser and the IPU. The current payment systems do not pay for health outcomes.
Most importantly, they do not consider health outcomes over the care cycle and
fail to provide dynamic incentives for the providers. This study investigates the
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contract that can coordinate the healthcare purchaser-IPU relationship over the
care cycle.
Chapter 4 studies the effects of different contractual arrangements on collabo-
ration dynamics among the providers involved in an IPU. A mathematical repre-
sentation that characterizes the relationship between the providers throughout the
care cycle is proposed. When efforts are not contractible, the contractual agree-
ment will determine the dynamics of the collaboration. Aside from characterizing
the first-best solution, the effects of reward-sharing and relational contracts, to-
gether with traditional schemes, such as capitation, are studied in this chapter.
The results of this dissertation shed light on the enablers of the value-based
healthcare delivery reform. This dissertation is the first to design a dynamic incen-
tives contract between the healthcare purchaser and the IPU, who is accountable
for the health outcomes of a patient over the care cycle. The optimal contract can
coordinate the objectives of the purchaser and the IPU and maximize social wel-
fare. In addition, this is the first study to characterize the collaboration dynamics
among the IPU members under different contractual agreements. The insights
from this study can strengthen the work relationship of the providers within an
IPU.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Healthcare systems are organizations of people, resources, and institutions de-
signed to provide healthcare services to meet the health needs of populations.
Canadian healthcare expenditures accounted for 11.4% of the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) in 2011 and were expected to reach an all-time high of $211 billion in
2013 [1]. With growing expenditures, governments and policy makers are paying
closer attention to health system performance measurement.
Healthcare systems are generally organized to deliver specific healthcare ser-
vices from a provider to the population. For example, a patient with diabetes
might go through different providers during his or her disease cycle, including a
primary care physician, nutritionist, diabetes nurse, endocrinologist, nephrologist,
ophthalmologist, psychiatrist/psychologist, social worker, laboratory, and dialysis
provider. The providers then receive payment for the specific service they provide.
Current care delivery is generally structured around specialties. Each health-
care provider treats patients whom need care from the provider, sometimes with
different medical conditions. Providers have traditionally been paid for the specific
1
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services they provide, known as fee-for-service payment. The fee-for-service rates
are usually set above marginal cost, intended to cover fixed costs through volume
of services. By covering all expenses and rewarding providers based on volume,
providers have little incentive to consider costs when treating their patients. Fur-
thermore, by rewarding volume instead of better health outcomes for patients, the
fee-for-service system might punish the efficient use of care [2].
To control the increasing healthcare expenditures and merely marginal health
improvements, healthcare reforms are emerging [3]. Michael Porter has introduced
the “Value-based Healthcare Delivery” reform, in which he defines value as a
patient’s health outcome per dollar spent [4]. Porter argues that value is the only
goal that can unite all stakeholders’ interests, because when providers succeed
in delivering higher value, everyone (including patients, employers, health plans,
and governments) will win through better health outcomes at lower costs [5].
Porter’s proposal is comprised of organizing care around a medical condition (or
around patient segments for primary care). Specifically, care will be provided by
a dedicated, multidisciplinary team who takes responsibility for the full cycle of
care for the condition, including outpatient, inpatient, and rehabilitative care, as
well as supporting services. This dedicated team of providers is called Integrated
Practice Unit (IPU) and is jointly accountable for the health outcomes of patients
and the costs of providing care. Costs will be measured around the patient and
will be aggregated around the full cycle of care for the patient’s medical condition.
As a result, the cost depends on the actual use of resources in a patient’s care
process.
Michael Porter defines health outcomes as survival, extent of recovery or func-
tionality restored, complications, recovery time, patient’s experience, and other
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aspects of a patient’s health. Accordingly, the payment system for the value-
based healthcare delivery should be modified to pay for health outcomes over the
care cycle.
It is worth noting that health is both demanded and produced by patients,
therefore it depends on many factors including patients’ compliance with the medi-
cal interventions, education and income level, and the quality of healthcare delivery
[6]. Healthcare delivery is one of many inputs into the health production process.
However, integrated care delivery including supporting services can arguably in-
fluence patient’s behavior and compliance with the care process.
Several payment systems have been studied and implemented in the healthcare
context [7–9]. Among these are fee-for-service, capitation, and pay-for-performance.
As mentioned earlier, fee-for-service mechanism covers all costs borne by the
provider plus a margin for each service they provide. Consequently, a fee-for-
service system can encourage the overprovision of healthcare services [10]. In a
capitation payment system, providers are paid an up-front fixed amount for each
patient enrolled under their care for a set of services for a period of time. Capita-
tion payment mechanism encourages providers to keep their patients healthy, but
yet it creates incentives for physicians to systematically select patients who are
healthier and require less care in the future, known as cream skimming. Further,
capitation payments mainly cover primary care services and exclude specialty or
hospital care. As a result, if a primary care physician refers a patient to a specialist
or to a hospital, the primary care physician can keep the capitation fee and not
need to provide the care. In summary, capitation payment could result in under-
provision of care [11]. Neither fee-for-service nor capitation payment systems can
incentivize the providers to improve health outcomes.
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In response to quality issues, changes to the payment systems have been pro-
posed to reward appropriate and high-quality care. This type of payment system
is known as pay-for-performance. Proposals for implementing pay-for-performance
payment systems vary from rewarding the providers for their processes (how things
are done) to the patients’ health outcomes (the effectiveness of treatments) [2]. De-
spite promising principles of pay-for-performance systems, their implementation
faces several significant challenges [12]. Among these challenges is the problem
of “multitasking,” that is if the providers face several tasks and their resources
are limited, then their effort will be allocated toward explicitly rewarded tasks.
Tying remuneration to processes is administratively easy to implement, but might
create unwanted results by encouraging the providers to concentrate on the pro-
cesses that are incentivized under pay-for-performance and ignore the processes
that are not. Additionally, pay-for-performance systems that pay for outcomes
are challenging to implement in the current structure: when healthcare providers
work individually, they cannot be held accountable for the health outcomes since
each provider can argue the other providers involved in the well-being of a patient
have not provided good quality of care [2].
The main objective of this dissertation is to use analytics to determine enabling
factors for the successful implementation of a value-based healthcare delivery re-
form. This dissertation consists of three core chapters. Chapter 2 draws insights
on the effects of current payment systems in fulfilling the objectives of value-based
healthcare delivery. Chapter 3 determines the optimal payment system between
the healthcare purchaser and the IPU. Chapter 4 studies the effects of different
contractual arrangements on collaboration dynamics among the providers involved
in an IPU.
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Chapter 2 studies the effect of current payment schemes, including fee-for-
service, capitation, and performance-based, on care provision. The effort each
provider exerts on patients has two dimensions: quality and integration of care.
Quality of care is defined as any aspect of care provision that improves the health
outcomes for the patient. High quality care needs more resources, thus it is costly.
Integration of care is to optimize and streamline the care process to ensure effi-
ciency and effectiveness. Highly integrated care leverages the information about
the patient’s interrelated conditions, shares resources, and eventually results in
cost reduction for the providers involved.
A mathematical representation of the healthcare delivery has been offered to
assess if any of the existing payment systems can incentivize providers to improve
the quality and integrate the care simultaneously. The results provide insights
on strengths, shortcomings, and applicability of each payment system in fulfilling
value-based healthcare delivery objectives.
Chapter 3 determines the optimal contract between the healthcare purchaser
and the IPU during the care cycle. The current payment systems are not paying
for health outcomes. Most importantly, they do not consider health outcomes
over the care cycle and fail to provide dynamic incentives for the providers. This
study investigates the contract that can coordinate the healthcare purchaser-IPU
relationship over the care cycle. A dynamic continuous-time principal-agent model
has been employed to characterize the optimal contract. The model considers the
interactions between treatment strategy and health outcomes, where there is a
single entity responsible for the health outcomes of a patient during care cycle.
Chapter 4 studies the potential partnership models among the healthcare
providers within an IPU. Particularly, this chapter investigates the effects of con-
tractual agreements on collaboration dynamics among the providers within an
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IPU. The relationship between the providers throughout the care cycle is modeled
using a finite-horizon dynamic game. When efforts are not contractible, the con-
tractual agreement will determine the dynamics of the collaboration. Aside from
characterizing the first-best solution, the effect of reward-sharing and relational
contracts, together with traditional schemes, such as capitation is studied in this
chapter. A relational contract is a combination of formal and informal contracts.
The formal contract promises a fixed amount to the provider no matter what the
health outcomes are. The informal contract includes a discretionary payment to
the provider after observing the health outcome in each period.
The results of this dissertation shed light on the enablers of the value-based
healthcare delivery reform. This dissertation is the first to design a dynamic incen-
tives contract between the healthcare purchaser and the IPU who is accountable
for the health outcomes of a patient over the care cycle. Current payment systems
fail to incentivize the IPU to be accountable for the health outcomes during the
care cycle. The optimal contract can coordinate the objectives of the purchaser
and the IPU and maximize the social welfare. In addition, this is the first study to
characterize the collaboration dynamics among the IPU members under different
contractual agreements. The insights from this study can strengthen the work
relationship of the providers within an IPU.
Chapter 2
Value-Based Healthcare Delivery:
A Principal-Agent Model
2.1 Introduction
Healthcare costs have increased in Canada and most developed countries. In the
latest report by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI), the total
health spending in 2013 was projected to an all-time high of $211 billion or $5,988
per person [1]. Total health expenditure in Canada was 11.4% of gross domestic
product (GDP) in 2011. It is forecast to be 11.3% in 2012 and 11.2% in 2013. The
rate of growth in health spending is slowing for the first time in nearly 15 years.
Healthcare costs are growing in many other developed countries as well. The rates
of increase in spending for all the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries, except for Iceland, were above the rates at which
their respective economies grew from 2000 to 2011 [1].
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Furthermore, costs are not the only concern in healthcare delivery systems.
Disintegration in information flow and continuity of care, resulting in inconsistent
patient services and unacceptable waiting times for patients, remains as a challenge
for healthcare systems [13]. Other than advances and innovations in healthcare
treatments and tools, improvements in healthcare delivery process is necessary as
well. Optimizing and streamlining the delivery processes, efficient and effective
decision making could result in better health outcomes.
In another report, CIHI examines the contributing factors to the growing ex-
penditures and focuses on the boom period, between 1998 and 2008, when the
annual health spending in Canada more than doubled [14]. This report studies
the major cost drivers of public-sector healthcare spending, which accounts for
70% of the total health care costs in Canada over the last decade. The main
contributing factors identified as compensation of healthcare providers, increased
use of services, and an evolution of types of services provided and used. Albeit
the shift in demographics, the aging of baby boomers only accounts for a modest
portion in healthcare spending increases, i.e. 0.8% per year from 1998 to 2008.
CIHI’s data demonstrates that the compensation paid to the healthcare providers
is one of the most significant portions of public-sector healthcare spending, Hos-
pitals (29.2%), drugs (15.9%), and physician services (14.4%) continue to account
for the largest shares of health dollars [1]. Furthermore, in Canada, the decisions
physicians make directly affect the use of drugs, hospital care, and diagnostic tests.
Since the healthcare delivery structure affects the expenditures, policy makers are
required to reform how healthcare is provided in order to ensure an efficient and ef-
fective system. CIHI recommends to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the
healthcare system, including the introduction of inter-professional collaboration to
provide team-based care, increased focus on patient-centered care, and providing
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incentives to healthcare providers to meet the needs of their patient population
[14].
In Canada primary healthcare reform, undertaken by provinces, is calling for
change in the structure of healthcare delivery [15]. The main concern of primary
care reform is to improve health outcomes and access to primary care for patients,
promote coordination among providers, and increase efficiency while improving
patient and provider satisfaction. The shift is toward team-based primary care, in
which the providers are accountable for providing comprehensive services to their
clients.
In addition, the necessity of restructuring the healthcare system has been rec-
ognized in other countries. In a report by the American Institute of Medicine,
the chasm between quality the U.S. healthcare system is capable of providing and
the care patients are receiving has been documented [16] and can be attributed
to the way healthcare is delivered and organized. Among other efforts, the U.S.
has employed different programs and mechanisms to impact the cost and quality
of care by using financial incentives to alter patient and provider behavior [17].
Examples include mechanisms and programs like pay for performance and disease
management, which concentrate on the quality of the care and use of tools to
improve patient health. Other stream of programs focuses on cost containment
and increases patient’s share in total cost of care, i.e. health savings account and
consumer-driven health plans. The drawback of cost containment programs is
where they raise conflicts. For example, when the patients are required to pay
more for their health, they tend to use less of necessary care, and therefore the
quality of care will be compromised [18].
One of the proposed reforms that can address the quest for both lower costs
and better health outcomes, is Michael Porter’s value-based healthcare delivery [4].
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Porter argues health outcomes cannot be improved efficiently, unless the value of
healthcare delivery is improved. Value in the healthcare context has been defined
as patient health outcomes per dollar spent. Health outcome has been defined
as survival, prevention of illness, early detection, right diagnosis, right treatment
to the right patient, fewer avoidable complications, greater functionality, slower
disease progression, and less care induced illnesses [5]. In order to enable im-
proved value for the patients, changes should take place in different pillars of the
system, including organizational structure, outcome and cost measurement, and
reimbursement systems.
Currently, the healthcare system is organized based on specialties and reim-
bursement is being made to individual providers, that is “specialized healthcare
delivery”. The other delivery system that supports value-based healthcare reform
is called Integrated Practice Unit (IPU). IPU is a team of providers formed around
medical conditions to provide all necessary care and is accountable for the health
outcomes of a patient during disease care cycle. A medical condition is an inter-
related set of patient medical circumstances that includes common co-occurring
conditions and complications, and requires multiple specialties and services to best
address the disease from the patient’s perspective. Care cycle for a medical con-
dition like cancer may include: monitoring, diagnosing, preparing, intervening,
recovering/rehabbing, and monitoring/managing. An IPU will have the capabil-
ity and knowledge to provide the required care and the authority over the care
process, which will incentivize the IPU to offer value for a patient. This type of
healthcare delivery is in its developing phase in many countries including the U.S.,
Canada, Germany, Rwanda, Taiwan, Sweden.
In the healthcare delivery context, the healthcare purchaser (hereafter, she)
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cannot provide the required treatments herself, 1 hence the presence of the health-
care provider (hereafter, he) becomes inevitable. 2 As a result, healthcare purchaser
and provider enter into a contractual agreement in which the health care provider
agrees to provide service to the covered population.
Given the current payment schemes, this chapter develops a principal-agent
framework to analytically evaluate under what conditions value-based healthcare
delivery can achieve its objectives of containing costs and improving quality. We
will consider the case where the government is the healthcare purchaser and the
healthcare delivery for a medical condition requires multiple providers with differ-
ing specialties and skills. When government is the purchaser, her objective is to
improve social welfare. Specifically, the purchaser is concerned with who receives
health services and whether they receive appropriate care to their condition. In
our model, we will assume all patients have universal health insurance and there-
fore the price of healthcare services will not affect the utilization of health care.
As a result, any individual would receive the necessary health care whenever they
need it.
Since the government is the healthcare purchaser, we assume she is concerned
with the appropriateness of care. Appropriateness of care could have many as-
pects, including receiving the right medical treatment and being treated in an
understanding way [19]. In the literature, terms like intensity or quality have been
used to capture the concept of appropriateness. In this chapter, we will refer to all
these aspects of care as quality of service. Quality of service is defined as any as-
pect of service that benefits the patients whether during the process of treatment
or after the treatment. Since the government is paying the providers from tax
revenues, she is also attentive to the costs of care. To incorporate appropriateness
1e.g. government or health insurer
2e.g. hospitals or physicians
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and cost-effectiveness in our model we will define two dimensions for the care:
quality and integration of care.
Both quality and integration of care will determine the outcomes of the care.
Overprovision of services may reduce the benefits of care when unnecessary services
or excessive treatments have harmful consequences [16]. Similarly, underprovision
of services may reduce health benefits if the essential services are not provided [10].
Integrated care will result in optimized delivery, neither over-providing nor under-
providing will occur. We assume when the care is integrated and the processes are
streamlined, patients will benefit from better health outcomes. Integration of care
could result in cost savings both by avoiding excessive harmful treatments and by
preempting the avoidable complications. In other words, the integration of care
and coordination among the providers will lead to enhanced health outcomes.
In the specialized healthcare delivery structure providers are organized based
on their specialties and each provider might provide services to multiple different
medical conditions that might require his expertise. In specialized healthcare de-
livery structure, providers will work individually. Working on their own may cause
individual providers to overlook comorbidities and the interdependencies between
interventions being provided somewhere else, which can increase the probability
of avoidable complications and result in lower expected health benefits. In the
IPU structure, efficiency gains may occur as a result of complementarities among
the treatments. Moreover, the probability of complications will be diminished as
a result of coordinated care.
There is supporting evidence showing that higher quality care drives down the
long term costs [20]. The value-based healthcare delivery brings the outcomes and
costs together, and reveals inefficiencies and opportunities to reallocate resource
usage. The IPU has the authority to eliminate high cost activities which do not
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lead to better health outcomes and identify activities with low costs corresponding
to superior outcomes.
We will study how the current payment schemes, including fee-for-service, cap-
itation, and performance-based payment, will direct the working mode among the
providers. We will first determine the socially optimal delivery structure, i.e. the
first-best solution, and then using the current payment schemes in the healthcare
context we will determine under what conditions the objectives of value-based
delivery will be met. Particularly, the results shed light on whether any of the
payment schemes could fulfill the value-based delivery reform’s objectives, encour-
aging cost efficiency and superior health outcomes at the same time.
Our results suggest that the performance-based payment system can achieve
similar results to the first-best solution but, the applicability of performance-based
payment system depends on the measurability and contractability of health out-
comes. Payment systems like capitation can induce integration or cost reduction
incentives, however, resulting in minimum quality provision. Low-powered con-
tracts like fee-for-service can provide quality improvement incentives, nevertheless
they are inefficient for the healthcare system. Capitation payment schemes can be
modified to hold providers fully accountable for complication costs, which is also
known as fundholding payment system [2]. When low quality provision results in
higher expected costs of complication, capitation with full accountability payment
system could outperform other contracts when rewards are not contractible.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analytically evaluate the
consequences of current payment schemes on the healthcare delivery structures
and evaluating their merit in fulfilling value- based delivery objectives.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We review the related
literature in the next section and present the model in §2.3 . We characterize
the first-best solution in §2.4 and study the effects of using fee-for-service, capita-
tion, and performance-based contracts on the organizational structure in §2.5. All
proofs appear in the Appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
This chapter builds upon the literature on contract theory, multi- dimensional task
assignment, economics of organization, and payment schemes in the healthcare
context.
There are two streams of research in contract theory. The first one focuses on
hidden information, also known as adverse selection, where one party has better
information than the other. An example of hidden information in healthcare de-
livery context is a case where the distribution of risk categories in a heterogeneous
population is not observable by the healthcare purchaser. Hidden information
studies in healthcare aim at finding incentive compatible contracts to reduce such
inefficiencies [21, 22]. The second stream of research concentrates on the ineffi-
ciencies caused by hidden actions where one party’s efforts are not verifiable by
the other party. 3 These situations happen when the healthcare purchaser cannot
observe the provider’s actions, treatment intensity, or the quality of the delivered
care [7, 9, 22, 26, 27]. Monitoring the actions of providers is either too costly or
not possible. When one party hires another party to take some action for her
as her agent, there should be a contract among the entities that can mitigate
3In the contract theory literature, the term “moral hazard” has been used extensively to
describe the problem where the efforts are not verifiable [23–25]. Here, however, we will use the
hidden action term to denote the same problem.
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difficulties cause by hidden action or hidden information. The contract design
problem is known as principal-agent problem [24]. The problem of hidden action
can be tackled by a contract that links the agent’s performance to the output of his
work. Inefficiencies can arise when the agent’s performance measure is distorted,
for example when it cannot incorporate time lags and interdependency.
In economics and game theory literature, when additional effort by one player
increases the productivity and benefits of the higher efforts for the others, strate-
gic complementarities exist [28]. Complementarities between diverse tasks have
raised attention in the manufacturing literature as well [29, 30]. The literature on
task assignment has shown the changing patterns in task allocations to employees
in a variety of settings. Evidence exists both in intra-organization and inter-
organization relationships. For example, the integration of marketing, billing, and
repair departments into a single customer service department, and also engaging
suppliers in the design of parts in the manufacturer-supplier relationships [29–31].
Principal-agent models have been extensively used to study the job design
problems as well. One of the most relevant studies is the work by Holmstrom
and Milgrom [32] in which they analyze the principal-agent model in a multi-task
context. Their paper focuses on the multidimensional tasks and how the difficulty
of measuring performance in all aspects can derive adverse affects in task accom-
plishment. Broad task assignments, i.e. assigning one agent the responsibility of
broad range of tasks, can result in higher incentive costs. When complementari-
ties are present, such incentive costs have been characterized as heterogeneity loss.
Under the assumption that the performance of each task is measured separately,
Holmstrom and Milgrom [32] also studied the possibility of task sharing. When
tasks are divisible and independent and the performance measure can only assess
one of the tasks, they have shown that one agent should perform the measurable
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task, while the other agent should perform the tasks that are hard to measure. In
healthcare delivery, each provider’s tasks have multiple dimensions also collective
efforts of the providers will determine the health outcomes for a patient.
In multi-task studies, the main assumption is that either several different tasks
are being assigned to an agent, or the agent’s tasks have several dimensions to it.
Zhang [33] have analyzed the impact of complementarities in assignment of multi-
ple tasks to agents. In his model, the principal chooses the optimal delegation of
tasks to two identical agents, whom are capable of doing all the tasks on their own.
When only the aggregate performance measures are available to the principal and
when tasks are complementary, Zhang has shown that the broad task assignments
results in more informative agent efforts and can overcome the heterogeneity loss.
When a better health outcome is what the purchaser is striving for, the system
boundaries for the healthcare provision should change. Value-based healthcare de-
livery, defines a medical condition as the set of patient medical circumstances that
includes common co-occurring conditions and complications, and requires multiple
specialties and services to best address the disease from the patient’s perspective
[34]. Providers can either work individually, as it is in the current healthcare deliv-
ery, or they could team up to provide all necessary care for the medical condition.
Using the notions of economies of scope [35], we assume providers could benefit
from the economies of diversification because of complementarity of their skills
and sharing the fixed costs of providing care to the patients [36].
Another important study is about the problem of hidden action within teams
[37]. Hidden action exists when actions of an agent cannot be observed and con-
tracted directly. In contrast to the single-agent models, even when there is no
uncertainty in output level, hidden action may occur in teams. The reason is that,
when the only available signal is aggregate output level, the agents who shirk
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cannot be identified. Holmstrom [37] showed that non-cooperative behavior will
result in an inefficient outcome when the output is fully shared among the agents.
Considering a single period principal-agent problem, their model demonstrates the
value of group incentives in eliminating the free-rider problem. However, imple-
mentation of group incentives requires the principal to enforce financial incentives,
that is to impose penalties when output is wasted and provide bonuses when out-
put is exceeded. Holmstrom expresses this function as the principal’s primary role,
and they call it breaking the budget-balance constraint [37].
In our model, we consider multiple players working toward a common goal of
improving health outcomes. With the language of Holmstrom [37], we assume
the providers will have a budget-breaker to impose the penalties among team
members, eliminating the problem of double hidden action. This complies with
the recommendations of value-based healthcare delivery, in which it is proposed
there should be a care manager overseeing each patient’s care process [20]. The
distinguishing part of our study is that we are investigating the effects of current
payment schemes on working mode among the providers, that is if current payment
schemes to the team of providers can encourage both cost efficiency and quality
improvement.
Several payment schemes have been proposed and implemented for the health-
care systems. Among these are fee-for-service, capitation, and pay-for-performance.
For a comprehensive review of healthcare payment systems, including an empiri-
cal analysis, refer to [8, 38, 39]. We will briefly describe the literature on fee-for-
service, capitation, and pay-for-performance payment schemes in this section.
Fee-for-service mechanism covers all costs borne by the provider plus a margin
for each service they provide. Consequently, a fee-for-service system can encourage
the overprovision of healthcare services [10]. In a capitation payment system,
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providers are paid an up-front fixed amount for each patient enrolled under their
care for a set of services for a period of time. Capitation payment mechanism
encourages providers to keep their patients healthy, but yet it creates incentives
for physicians to systematically select patients who are healthier and require less
care in the future, known as cream skimming [2]. Further, capitation payments
mainly cover primary care services and exclude specialty or hospital care. As a
result, if a primary care physician refers a patient to a specialist or to a hospital,
the primary care physician can keep the capitation fee and not need to provide
the care. In summary, capitation payment could result in underprovision of care
[11]. Neither fee-for-service nor capitation payment systems can incentivize the
providers to improve health outcomes.
In response to quality issues, changes to the payment systems have been pro-
posed to reward appropriate and high-quality care. This type of payment system
is known as pay-for-performance. Proposals for implementing pay-for-performance
payment systems vary from rewarding the providers for their processes (how things
are done) to the patients’ health outcomes (the effectiveness of treatments). De-
spite promising principles of pay-for-performance systems, their implementation
faces several significant challenges [12]. Among these challenges is the problem
of “multitasking,” that is if the providers face several tasks and their resources
are limited, then their effort will be allocated toward explicitly rewarded tasks.
Tying remuneration to processes is administratively easy to implement, but might
create unwanted results by encouraging the providers to concentrate on the pro-
cesses that are incentivized under pay-for-performance and ignore the processes
that are not. Many fundamental questions still are open. For example, what type
of clinical conditions or healthcare services should be target of quality improve-
ment incentives? To whom should such incentives be directed to: the patient, the
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healthcare provider, the provider group, or hospital, or all of these parties? What
type of measures should be rewarded: process of care, outcomes, or both? For
a systematic review and evaluation of pay- for-performance systems see Petersen
et. al. [40]. Additionally, pay-for-performance systems that pay for outcomes
are challenging to implement in the current structure: when healthcare providers
work individually, they cannot be held accountable for the health outcomes since
each provider can argue the other providers involved in the well-being of a patient
have not provided good quality of care [2].
In this chapter, we are not concerned with designing the optimal payment
scheme, however we are interested to see how payment schemes can reinforce the
objectives of value-based healthcare delivery.
2.3 The Model
We assume multiple providers are required to treat a patient with a specific medical
condition. In the current healthcare delivery structure, the healthcare providers
work individually in silos on each patient without coordinating the care. Lack of
integration and coordination of care might result in suboptimal care provision by
either underproviding or overproviding the services. Integrated care could result
in better health outcomes through complementary skills, information, and also
through the accumulation of experience. The value-based healthcare delivery re-
form intends to bring all the neccessary service providers for a medical condition
together to optimize the delivery of healthcare. The main tenets of this reform
are based on integrating and optimizing the care for the patients with a specific
condition to improve the health outcomes while containing the costs.
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Table 2.1: Quality of service and integration efforts and the working outcomes
Quality \ Integration High Low
High Duo Soleq
Low Solee None
We assume the health outcome, which is commonly observable, depends on the
treatments each patient receives. Providers will choose the quality of service q and
integration effort level e to be exerted on the patient. We consider two possible
levels of quality and two possible levels of integration: high and low, denoted by H
and L, respectively. As a result of this binary action sets in quality and integration
aspects of care, four outcomes are possible, as depicted in table 2.1. If both high
quality services and high integration efforts have been exerted, the outcome is
referred to as Duo. If only quality of service or integration of care is at high level,
the outcome is referred to as Soleq or Solee, respectively. When both quality and
integration are at low level, the outcome is referred to as None.
Note when providers integrate the care, they have the opportunity to focus
on optimizing the total cost of the care cycle rather than minimizing the costs of
discrete services.
The total monetary cost of treatments consists of fixed cost F and variable
cost c. The variable cost for the providers depends on the quality of treatments q
and integration efforts e. The variable cost increases with the quality of treatment
and decreases with integration efforts. Therefore, the cost of healthcare delivery
cj depends on the working outcome j = {d, sq, se, n} representing Duo, Soleq,
Solee, and None, respectively. When the integration efforts are at high level, the
working outcome is assumed to be efficient because the providers are focusing on
streamlining the care and optimizing the delivery process, as a result cs
e
< cn
and cd < cs
q
. Furthermore, the high quality service costs more than low quality
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service. As a result, cd > cs
e
and cs
q
> cn. With the above assumptions, the
ordering of costs for all the working modes is cs
q
> cd > cn > cs
e
.
Similary, the fixed cost for the providers in working mode j is F j. However,
we will assume the fixed cost will only depend on the level of integration. When
providers employ low level of integration, they are working individually and there-
fore, the fixed cost of providing care is the same for the providers at working mode
Soleq and None, F s
q
= F n. We will denote the fixed cost of working at low integra-
tion level with Fs. Furthermore, the fixed cost of working in full integration is equal
as well, F d = F s
e
and will be denoted by Fc. The fixed cost of integration might
appear as hindrance if the cost of establishing the team of providers is greater
than working individually, Fc > Fs. However, after the initial establishment of
the team, the providers will have the opportunity of consolidating their resources.
Eliminating the redundant administrative and scheduling resources might result
in cost savings for all the providers involved in the integrated unit, Fc ≤ Fs. As a
result, if integration of care results in lower fixed cost for all the providers in com-
parison to them working individually ∆F = Fc − Fs ≤ 0. However, if integration
is more costly, then ∆F = Fc − Fs > 0.
The health benefit for the patients also depends on the working outcome j,
where j = {d, sq, se, n} representing Duo, Soleq, Solee, and None, respectively and
will be denoted by bj. We assume health benefits are in dollar units, representing
the value of health outcomes to the healthcare purchaser.
In this chapter, we are not concerned with how to measure the benefits from
provision of different services. The benefits of the healthcare service could encom-
pass multiple dimensions including survival, degree of health acheived or retained,
time to recovery, disutility of care process, and complications and recurrences. In
the value-based healthcare delivery setting, health outcome improvement has been
Chapter 2 22
defined as prevention of illness, early detection, right diagnosis, right treatment
to the right patient, fewer avoidable complications, greater functionality, slower
disease progression, and less care induced illnesses [5].
Research has shown that the excessive utilization of services does not produce
better health outcomes [20]. Furthermore, fragmentation of services could cause
diseconomies of scale, where inadequate volume of patients in a medical condition
has hindered the accumulation of knowledge and achievement of excellence in the
care [20]. As a result, we assume the health benefit increases with the quality of
services and integration efforts. When providers work collaboratively and integrate
the care, their skills are complementing each other and the care process is more
effective. As a result, bd > bs
q
and bs
e
> bn. Plus, patients will always prefer
high quality service to low quality service, bs
q
> bn and bd > bs
e
. Therefore, the
ordering of benefit for the patients for all the working modes is bd > bs
q
> bs
e
> bn.
We assume perfect information about the patient and the costs. When efforts
are verifiable by a third party, the parties can write a contract to maximize the
total surplus. We refer to this situation as the first-best solution. When efforts
are not contractible, the first-best contract is generally not attainable, resulting
in the situation of hidden action.
2.4 The First-Best Solution
In this section, we study the first-best working mode for the team of providers.
Consider the first-best solution as the benchmark solution, as if the all of providers
efforts were verifiable at no cost. In this case, the purchaser would determine the
working mode so as to maximize the total surplus. To determine the first-best
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Table 2.2: Total surplus in each working mode
Quality \ Integration High Low
High bd − cd − Fc bsq − csq − Fs
Low bs
e − cse − Fc bn − cn − Fs
working mode, we need to identify the objective function for the purchaser and
providers. The payoff for both purchaser and provider is dependent on the working
mode.
The healthcare purchaser transfers payment t to the providers according to a
predetermined arrangment. As a result, healthcare purchaser’s objective is,
bj − t.
The healthcare providers would receive t in compensation while spending cj and
F j for providing treatments in the working mode j,
t− cj − F j.
As a result, the total surplus is,
bj − cj − F j.
Recall, according to the cost and benefit structure, cs
q
> cd > cn > cs
e
and
bd > bs
q
> bs
e
> bn, we will determine which working mode would be the first-
best in each situation. The next observation provides a full characterization of
first-best working mode.
Observation 2.1. When integration is effective i.e. cs
q
> cd > cn > cs
e
and
bd > bs
q
> bs
e
> bn,
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(i) whenever ∆F < 0
(a) working mode Duo or Solee would always dominate and therefore, inte-
gration of care is always optimal.
(b) Duo will be the optimal working mode if bd − bse > cd − cse.
(c) if the marginal benefits of providing high quality treatment is smaller than
its marginal costs, it is always optimal to work in Solee mode.
(ii) whenever ∆F ≥ 0
(a) integration would only be beneficial if health benefit exceeds the total cost,
or when
bd − bsq > cd − csq + ∆F
and
bs
e − bn > cse − cn + ∆F.
(b) if (a) holds, Duo will be the optimal working mode if bd − bse > cd − cse.
(c) the necessary conditions for integration of care are when
cs
q − cd > ∆F
and
cn − cse > ∆F
both hold.
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2.5 Hidden Action
In this section, we analyze the following situation: the healthcare purchaser offers
a contract to the healthcare providers to supply care to the patient population.
The providers choose quality of service q and integration effort level e, which in
turn affect the health benefits for the patients. Exerting efforts and providing high
quality service is costly to the providers, and the purchaser has to compensate the
providers for incurring these costs. We assume the efforts are not verifiable to the
purchaser, thus not contractible, and the providers might deviate from the socially
optimal solution in order to maximize their own payoff. Since efforts are not
verifiable, we are facing the hidden action problem. In this chapter, we assume that
the providers whom are working in a team can verify the other providers’ efforts
and therefore we will not face the multisided hidden action problem. Multisided
hidden action arises when several agents take complementary hidden actions [25,
37].
Using similar assumptions to the standard hidden action problem, we assume
all parties are symmetrically informed about costs, patient risk factors, and health
outcomes [41]. The health outcomes are verifiable, hence contractible. The health-
care purchaser observes the health outcomes and will pay providers a transfer
payment t according to a predetermined arrangement. Once the payment scheme
is determined, the healthcare providers simultaneously take action. The actions
are completed before any performance measures are realized. Therefore, the ac-
tions cannot be changed when the health outcomes have been observed. These
assumptions are common assumptions in the context of principal-agent model [24].
Even though there may be other sources of incentives for the providers, such
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as reputation, we will only consider monetary incentives in our model. As men-
tioned before, the health outcome depends on some parameters that are beyond
the providers’ control including compliance to the treatment, income level, educa-
tion level, and family history. However, health outcomes critically depend on the
collective level of effort providers exert on the patient. In other words, the quality
of service as well as level of integration will determine the health benefits.
We will focus on the single period model. In particular, there is only one period
in which providers take action. As a result, the effect of feedback and dynamics is
not studied in this chapter. The contract will govern the one period game among
the providers and purchaser.
We analyze the resulting working mode for the providers using different pay-
ment schemes in the healthcare contracting literature. Specifically, we will study
the effects of fee- for-service, capitation, and performance-based payment schemes
on the optimal working mode for the providers. Assuming the healthcare pur-
chaser wants to maximize the value of health outcome, the purchaser’s problem
is
max
j
bj − t, (2.1)
where the money transfer to the providers is denoted by t. The provider is also
concerned about his financial surplus either because it is a for-profit organization
or because the surplus can be spent on improving the facilities. Therefore, the
problem is subject to the providers’ incentive compatibility constraint
arg max
j
t− cj − F j (2.2)
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and their participation constraints:
t− cj − F j ≥ w, (2.3)
where cj and F j is respectively, the variable and fixed cost of working in mode j =
{d, sq, se, n} and w is providers’ reservation wage. Particularly, reservation wage
is the amount of money providers could get if they worked in another healthcare
delivery structure. For simplification, we will assume w = 0.
2.5.1 Fee-for-Service
One of the most commonly used payment schemes is the cost- based payment
scheme in which the providers are fully reimbursed for all costs of medical services
provided to the patient. The provider’s reimbursement varies with the actual
treatment decisions or the resource use [39]. Under this payment scheme, the
providers have weaker incentives to reduce the costs or resource usage.
We will compare the payoffs for each working mode, given that the providers
will be reimbursed for the cost of treatments. To control the costs the purchaser
usually caps the fees at a certain level based on the treatment type. Furthermore,
in fee-for-service payment system, the fees are usually set based on services pro-
vided and since the collaboration efforts are not verifiable, we will assume that
the payments for providing high quality care is denoted by tH and the payments
for providing low quality care is denoted by tL.
The providers’ payoffs for each working mode, given the fee-for-service payment
scheme, are given in table 2.3. Providers will choose their desired working mode
based on the total payoff in each working mode.
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Table 2.3: Providers’ payoffs with fee-for-service payment scheme
Quality \ Integration High Low
High tH − cd − Fc tH − csq − Fs
Low tL − cse − Fc tL − cn − Fs
Observation 2.2 describes the optimal working mode for the providers, when
they are reimbursed according to fee-for-service payment scheme and when inte-
gration is effective, cs
q
> cd > cn > cs
e
and bd > bs
q
> bs
e
> bn.
Observation 2.2. When providers are reimbursed according to fee-for-service pay-
ment scheme and td = ts
q
= tH and ts
e
= tn = tL
(i) If ∆F < 0, it is always optimal for the providers to integrate the care and
benefit from the cost savings they create.
(ii) If ∆F ≥ 0, integration is optimal when both
cs
q − cd > ∆F
and
cn − cse > ∆F
hold.
(iii) when either (i) or (ii) holds, working mode Duo is optimal if tH−tL > cd−cse.
When ∆F ≥ 0 the conditions for integration using fee-for-service payment, are
similar to the necessary conditions of integration in the first-best solution. But,
with the fee-for-service payment system when cs
q − cd < ∆F and cn − cse < ∆F ,
integration will not occur, even though it is still optimal to integrate the care in
the first-best solution. Recall, from the first-best solution that the integration
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would be optimal if
bd − bsq > cd − csq + ∆F
and
bs
e − bn > cse − cn + ∆F
hold. With fee-for-service payment scheme, the providers could deviate or not
deviate from the efficient levels of quality. Basically, the fee-for-service payment
does not incentivize the providers provide efficient level of quality. Even though
fee-for-service payment system could implement the first-best solution, given the
conditions in observation 2.2 , the cost savings from integration are not transferred
to the purchaser. Even though it is not socially optimal, the purchaser still could
gain from the higher expected benefits for the patients if the providers work in
Duo mode.
2.5.2 Capitation
In order to provide cost-reduction incentives to healthcare providers, the purchaser
might prefer a capitation payment scheme in which the providers receive a fixed
payment per patient for a given time period. In return, the provider is required
to provide care to the patients for a given period of time without any additional
reimbursements. To incorporate capitation in our model, we assume providers
receive a fixed fee tC in each period for each patient. With capitation payment
system, the providers are encouraged to keep patients as healthy as possible. Since
the providers’ income depends on how much care their patients need, the providers
might choose the healthier patients whom require less care, also known as cream
skimming. To eliminate this effect, we assume providers are dealing with a homo-
geneous patient population.
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We will consider two scenarios on who is accountable for the complication costs.
In the first scenario, which we call partial accountability, the purchaser reimburses
the providers for any adverse health outcomes. However, in the second scenario, we
assume the providers must provide care to the patient for a given period without
any marginal reimbursement. We call the second scenario full accountability, which
is also known as fundholding system in healthcare contracting literature [2]. In
this case, the providers will be encouraged to prevent any avoidable complications.
We will denote the expected costs of complications by vj given working mode
j = {d, sq, se, n}. We assume if providers work in integration and provide high
quality care, the expected cost of complication will be the least, we assume the
following ordering for the expected cost of complication vd < vs
q
< vs
e
< vn.
2.5.2.1 Partial Accountability
First, let us assume the purchaser pays for any adverse health outcomes for the pa-
tients, including hospitalization. In this case the healthcare purchaser’s objective
is to maximize
bj − tC − vj,
where tC is the money transfer to the providers in capitation, and vj is the expected
costs of complications given working mode j = {d, sq, se, n}. The problem is
subject to the providers’ incentive compatibility constraints
arg max
j
tC − cj − F j,
and the providers’ participation constraints
tC − cj − F j ≥ w.
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Table 2.4: Providers’ payoffs with capitation payment scheme
Quality \ Integration High Low
High tC − cd − Fc tC − csq − Fs
Low tC − cse − Fc tC − cn − Fs
Recall, w is the providers’ reservation wage if they worked in another healthcare
delivery system. Again, for simplification we will set w = 0. The summary of
providers’ payoffs is given in table 2.4.
Observation 2.3. When the purchaser is responsible to pay for any adverse health
outcome expenses; the case of partial accountability
(i) If ∆F < 0, it is always optimal to work in Solee mode.
(ii) However when ∆F > 0
(a) if cs
q − cd > ∆F , Solee is the dominating working mode.
(b) if cs
q − cd < ∆F , None is the dominating working mode.
(c) if cs
q − cd = ∆F , either Solee or None will dominate.
When better health outcomes involve higher costs, the providers set the ef-
fort levels to the lowest level. As a result, capitation with partial accountability
payment system cannot fulfill the objectives of value-based delivery.
2.5.2.2 Full Accountability
The second scenario is when the providers are fully accountable for health outcome.
In this case, if any adverse health outcomes occur, it is the responsibility of the
providers to treat the patients using the allocated money, tC . As a result, the
expected cost of complication for each patient in each period vj will be paid out
Chapter 2 32
Table 2.5: Providers’ payoff with capitation payment scheme and full account-
ability for complications
Quality \ Integration High Low
High tC − cd − vd − Fc tC − csq − vsq − Fs
Low tC − cse − vse − Fc tC − cn − vn − Fs
of tC . Recall, vj only depends on the working mode j. The healthcare purchaser’s
objective is to maximize
bj − tC
subject to the providers’ incentive compatibility constraints
arg max
j
tC − cj − vj − F j,
and their participation compatibility constraints
tC − cj − vj − F j ≥ 0.
The summary of payoffs for the capitation payment with full accountability
for the health outcomes is given in table 2.5. Observation 2.4 summarizes the
working outcomes with capitation payment scheme and full accountability for the
complications.
Observation 2.4. When the providers are accountable for the complication costs:
(i) If ∆F < 0, it is always optimal to work in Duo mode.
(ii) However when ∆F > 0
(a) if −(vd − vsq) > cd − csq , Duo will dominate all other working modes.
(b) otherwise, working mode Soleq dominates.
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Observation 2.4 suggests that the providers will always work in collaboration
offering high quality treatments if the fixed costs of collaboration is lower than
fixed costs of individual service provision. The reason for this effect is because
providers’ income is linked to the benefits for the patients. Better health outcomes
and benefits for the patients correspond to lower complication costs. When high
quality service is offered in integration it will result in lower expected costs, and
therefore working mode Duo is optimal. In contrast, when collaboration has more
fixed costs than individual work the providers will only work in Duo mode if the
total expected cost of care in Soleq mode exceeds the total expected cost of care
in Duo. When providers are responsible for the complication costs, the providers’
compensation should increase to satisfy the providers’ participation constraint, i.e.
tC ≥ cd + vd + FC . Even though the purchaser is incurring vd, she can motivate
the providers to work in Duo mode. Since vd < vs
q
< vs
e
< vn, the purchaser
is paying the minimum cost of complication instead of vs
e
or vn, which was the
result of capitation with partial accountability. As a result, capitation with full
accountability payment encourages the providers to work in Duo mode instead
of working in Solee or None mode which is costlier to the purchaser. Expected
complication costs in Duo mode, could be interpreted as unavoidable complication
costs.
2.5.3 Performance-Based
Health outcomes are the result of collective efforts of all providers involved in
the care process. Healthcare purchaser evaluates health outcome based on some
performance measure. We assume this performance measure is a single aggregate
measure that depends positively on each provider’s efforts. Under the assumptions
stated in §2.3 about the expected health outcome and costs, integration and quality
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Table 2.6: Payoff for the providers with performance-based payment scheme
in each working mode
Quality \ Integration High Low
High tdPB − cd − Fc tsqPB − csq − Fs
Low ts
e
PB − cse − Fc tnPB − cn − Fs
are complementing each other. That is, the providers are inclined to exert high
quality treatment when they work in collaboration and the care is integrated.
One of the main insights from Holmstrom’s study on moral hazard in teams is
that the principal can provide optimal incentives to multiple agents involved in the
process by acting as the budget-breaker and giving shares of aggregate output to
the agents [37]. In this section, we will study the preferred working mode under the
performance-based contracts. According to these type of contracts the providers
will receive a fixed fee β and a share α of the output. In the case of healthcare
delivery, providers will receive transfer payment tPB(b
j) dependent on the health
outcome bj. We denote this payment scheme with tjPB, and define it as
tjPB = αb
j + β,
where bj is the health outcome in working mode j. Since the expected health
outcome depends on both the quality of care and the level of integration, expected
payoff for the providers also depends on both dimensions of the care.
In the performance-based contract, the purchaser’s objective is to maximize
bj − tjPB. However, each provider wants to maximize his payoff while satisfying
the participation constraint. The payoffs for each of the working modes are listed
in table 2.6. We are assuming that β is the same for all the working modes.
Observation 2.5. When the providers are paid based on the health outcomes
attained:
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(i) If ∆F < 0, integration is always optimal.
(a) Duo is optimal only if α(bd − bse) > cd − cse.
(b) Otherwise, Solee will dominate all other working modes.
(ii) However, when ∆F > 0:
(a) Integration is optimal if both
α(bd − bsq) > (cd − csq) + ∆F
and
α(bs
e − bn) > (cse − cn) + ∆F
hold.
(b) if (a) holds, Duo is optimal only if α(bd − bse) > cd − cse.
(c) The necessary conditions for integration are when
cs
q − cd > ∆F
and
cn − cse > ∆F
hold.
Working mode outcomes under performance-based contracts are in general
similar to the first-best solution. However, the purchaser pays αbj + β to the
providers to induce similar results to the first-best solution. Rewarding or pun-
ishing the providers based on the health outcomes encourages them to exert high
quality treatments in integration. This situation belongs to the class of noncoop-
erative games named supermodular games. In this type of models, more activity
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by some members raises the return to the increased levels of activity by others
[28, 42]. The same situation applies here to the two dimensions of care, when care
is integrated the payoffs will be higher if high quality care is provided as well.
Even though performance-based payment system could create similar results to
the first-best solution, its applicability depends on the contractability of health
outcomes.
2.6 Conclusions
Currently, healthcare delivery is challenged by increasing expenditures and less
than optimal health outcomes. Value-based healthcare delivery reform intends
to improve health outcomes while containing the costs [5]. Michael Porter argues
that organizational structure, outcome and cost measurement, and reimbursement
systems should be modified to encourage value provision. In this study, we investi-
gate the effect of current payment systems including fee-for-service, capitation, and
performance-based on the objectives of value-based healthcare delivery. Specifi-
cally, we determined conditions under which the providers would be encouraged
to work collaboratively to integrate the care and provide high quality treatments.
The results suggest that the performance-based payment scheme can achieve
similar results to the first-best solution, but the applicability of this payment
scheme depends on the measurability and contractability of health outcomes. Con-
tracts like capitation can induce integration or cost reduction incentives, however
results in minimum quality provision. Contracts like fee- for-service can support
high quality treatments but may not result in lower costs. Thus, fee-for-service
is not an efficient way of achieving high quality treatment. Capitation payment
system can be modified to include the possibility of complications, When the
Chapter 2 37
purchaser holds the providers fully accountable for the avoidable complications,
providers can be motivated to provide high quality service and integrate the care.
When low quality provision results in higher expected costs of complication, cap-
itation with full accountability can outperform other contracts when the health
outcomes are noncontractible.
Fixed cost of care affects the results critically. When integration results in cost
savings for the providers ∆F < 0, the providers could be incentivized to work
in collaboration and to provide high quality care. However, if the fixed cost of
providing care in all the working modes is the same, our notation of fixed cost
could be interpreted as the nonmonetary cost of care. In other words, ∆F could
be used to describe a situation where the providers enjoy working collaboratively,
∆F < 0 or where the providers find collaboration ineffective, ∆F ≥ 0. With this
interpretation, the current results of the model could be applied to draw insights
on the non-monetary cost of care.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analytically evaluate the
consequences of current payment schemes on the healthcare delivery structures
and evaluating their merit in fulfilling value-based delivery objectives. We built
a simple model to determine what is the resulting organizational structure given
the current healthcare payment system.
This research can be extended in few directions. First, since health outcomes
are only observed after care has been provided and some of outcomes will only be
observable after a time lag, it is crucial to study the healthcare delivery system
considering a dynamic programming approach. Currently, we have used a static
model to evaluate the working mode outcomes, however this model could be im-
proved to consider the dynamics of the relationship over the care cycle. Second,
the reputation incentives could be incorporated in the model, when the purchaser
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infer information about the benefits of future care from observing current health
outcomes. The current model could be modified to include the behavioral effects.
By adding non-monetary cost of integration or quality provision to the model,
we can analyze how the effectiveness of teamwork or the care providers’ altruistic
motives affect the results.
2.A Appendix: Chapter 2 Proofs
2.A.1 The First-Best Solution
We will start the analysis when ∆F < 0. Under the assumption that cd < cs
q
and
bd > bs
q
, the RHS of
bd − bsq > cd − csq + ∆F
is always negative and the above equation holds. In this case, the working mode
Duo would always dominate Soleq. With the same argument, since cs
e
< cn and
bs
e
> bn, if ∆F < 0, Solee dominates None as well, i.e. bs
e − bn > cse − cn + ∆F
will always hold.
Since the fixed costs of working in Duo and Solee are assumed to be equal,
with bd > bs
e
and cd > cs
e
, the providers would always prefer Duo if
bd − bse > cd − cse , (2.4)
otherwise, if bd − bse < cd − cse , working mode Solee will be optimal.
Now we will explore the first-best working mode when the fixed cost of inte-
gration is higher than working individually, Fv > Fs or ∆F > 0. In this case,
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providing integrated care would be beneficial if
bd − bsq > (cd − csq) + ∆F (2.5)
and
bs
e − bn > (cse − cn) + ∆F (2.6)
hold. When both equations (2.5) and (2.6) hold, the high quality treatment would
be preferred to the low quality treatment only if the marginal benefit of high
quality treatment exceeds its marginal cost, or when
bd − bse > cd − cse . (2.7)
Consequently, working mode Duo is optimal only if equations (2.5), (2.6), and
(2.7) hold.
Since bd > bs
q
, if the RHS of the equations (2.5) and (2.6) is negative, i.e.
cd − csq + ∆F < 0
and
cs
e − cn + ∆F < 0
both equations (2.5) and (2.6) will hold and integration is optimal. As a result,
the necessary conditions for integration exist when
cs
q − cd > ∆F
and
cn − cse > ∆F.
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2.A.2 Fee-for-Service
As with the first-best analysis, we will start by assuming that integration is effec-
tive and its fixed cost could be less than the fixed cost of providing care individ-
ually, Fv < Fs or ∆F < 0. First, we will compare the working modes Duo and
Soleq. As a result, if
tH − cd − Fv > tH − csq − Fs
cs
q − cd > ∆F
Duo would dominate Soleq. Assuming that the providers’ integration efforts can
result in cost reduction, cd < cs
q
, the LHS is always negative and the above
equation always holds. As a result, when ∆F < 0 the collaborative work would
always be optimal. The argument is similar for comparing integration in providing
low quality service as well. Since cs
e
< cn, when ∆F < 0
cn − cse > ∆F
will always hold. In summary, if integration efforts are efficient, the providers will
always prefer to work in integration. This is the same condition that was required
to acheive the first-best solution as well.
To determine if providers would prefer providing high quality treatment or low
quality treatment, we need to compare the payoffs at Duo and Soloe modes
tH − cd − Fc > tL − cse − Fc
Consequently, if
tH − tL > cd − cse (2.8)
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the providers would always prefer providing high quality care. Nonetheless, if
tH − tL = cd− cse the providers have no incentive to not deviate from the efficient
level of quality, although no incentive to deviate either, which might not be socially
optimal given that bd > bs
e
.
The purchaser prefers high quality treatments if
bd − tH > bse − tL
bd − bse > tH − tL (2.9)
The providers might prefer providing high quality care, equation (2.8), while
the purchaser does not consider that as the optimal mode, when the expected ben-
efit of high quality treatment is marginal, bd−bse < tH−tL. This is a confirmation
to the criticism that the providers would prefer overproviding care even if it is not
socially optimal.
If integration has higher fixed cost than working alone Fv ≥ Fs or ∆F >
0, given the fee-for-service payment scheme the providers would prefer working
individually if
cs
q − cd < ∆F
and
cn − cse < ∆F
hold, although this might not mean that it is socially optimal to work individually.
In other words, the latter conditions would not necessarily translate to
bd − bsq < (cd − csq) + ∆F
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and
bs
e − bn < (cse − cn) + ∆F.
2.A.3 Capitation
We will first analyze the case where the purchaser is responsible to pay for any
adverse health outcome expenses. The providers’ payoffs are given in table 2.4.
For the integration to be rewarding,
tC − cd − Fv > tC − csq − Fs
and
tC − cse − Fv > tC − cn − Fs
should hold. In other words,
cs
q − cd > ∆F (2.10)
and
cn − cse > ∆F. (2.11)
If the above equations hold, the providers will always prefer the low quality treat-
ments.
In the case where ∆F < 0, since cd < cs
q
and cs
e
< cn, equations (2.10) and
(2.11) will always hold, therefore integration is optimal. However, since cs
e
< cd,
the provider will always prefer the low quality treatments and working mode Solee
will dominate all other working modes.
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In the case where ∆F > 0, if equations (2.10) and (2.11) are valid, with the
same arguments, Solee dominates other working modes. However, if
cs
q − cd < ∆F
working mode None will dominate. If cs
q − cd = ∆F either None or Solee is the
dominant work mode. In all the above cases, this type of capitation payment
results in low quality treatments.
However, if the providers are responsible for the avoidable costs of complica-
tions, results will change. From the perspective of the providers, the integration
is optimal if
(cs
q − cd) + (vsq − vd) > ∆F (2.12)
and
(cn − cse) + (vn − vse) > ∆F (2.13)
hold. If ∆F < 0, both equations (2.12) and (2.13) will always hold, and therefore
it is always optimal to work in integration. In this case, to evaluate providers’
choice between high and low quality treatments, we have to compare the payoffs
in working modes Duo and Solee. If the payoff in working mode Duo is higher
than that of Solee,
tC − cd − vd − Fc > tC − cse − vse − Fc
or
vs
e − vd > cd − cse , (2.14)
the providers would prefer Duo. As a result, when ∆F < 0, the providers would
prefer high quality treatments to low quality treatments if equation (2.14) holds.
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This means that the providers would prefer higher quality treatments, if the
marginal expected cost of complications providing low quality treatments is greater
than the marginal cost of providing high quality treatments.
However, when ∆F > 0, the collaboration will be optimal if both equations
(2.12) and (2.13) hold. In the case that collaboration is not preferred, i.e.
(cs
q − cd) + (vsq − vd) < ∆F (2.15)
and
(cn − cse) + (vn − vse) < ∆F, (2.16)
the providers’ choice between high quality treatments and low quality treatments
will depend on the payoffs in working modes Soleq and None. Providing high
quality treatments individually, i.e. Soleq, would be preferred if both equations
(2.15) and (2.16) hold and also
vn − vsq > csq − cn.
2.A.4 Performance-Based
For the providers to prefer integration, the following two conditions must hold.
αbd + β − cd − Fc > αbsq + β − csq − Fs
and
αbs
e
+ β − cse − Fc > αbn + β − cn − Fs.
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In summary, if
α(bd − bsq) + (csq − cd) > ∆F (2.17)
α(bs
e − bn) + (cn − cse) > ∆F (2.18)
integration is optimal. Providing high quality treatments in collaboration would
be the preferred option if
α(bd − bse) > cd − cse (2.19)
also holds.
If ∆F < 0, the RHS of equations (2.17) and (2.18) is always negative. Given
the cost and benefit structure described in section 3, the LHS of equations (2.17)
and (2.18) is always positive and therefore both equations will always hold. As a
result, if ∆F < 0, collaboration is optimal. However, if ∆F > 0, no working mode
will be dominant in all circumstances. The working mode choice will depend on
the expected payoff. If equations (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19) hold, working mode
Duo will dominate all other choices.
Nevertheless, if neither equation (2.17) nor (2.18) holds, then any working
mode could be dominant.
Since bd > bs
q
, if
cd − csq + ∆F < 0
and
cs
e − cn + ∆F < 0
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both equations (2.17) and (2.18) will hold and integration is optimal. As a result,
the necessary conditions for integration are when
cs
q − cd > ∆F
and
cn − cse > ∆F.
Of course, the analysis is sensitive to the cost and benefit structure. If col-
laboration does not result in cost reduction for providers, i.e. cd < cs
q
and the
expected health benefits are not any different than working individually, bd ≤ bsq ,
the collaboration might not dominate other working modes.
Chapter 3
Coordinating Contracts in the
Value-Based Healthcare Delivery;
Effect of Integration and
Dynamic Incentives
3.1 Introduction
Achieving good health outcomes is the core objective of healthcare systems. Im-
proving healthcare systems’ performance depends on the healthcare provision, hu-
man and physical resources, financing, and setting and enforcing rules and strategic
direction for all the entities involved [3]. Currently, Canada along with other devel-
oped countries are facing rising healthcare expenditures while they are challenged
to improve the healthcare system’s performance [1].
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One of the reforms that addresses the current challenges in the healthcare de-
livery system is Michael Porter’s Value-based Healthcare Delivery [5], which defines
value as a patient’s health outcome per dollar spent. Porter argues that value is
the goal that can unite all stakeholders’ interests, because when providers suc-
ceed in delivering higher value, everyone (including patients, healthcare providers,
health plans, and governments) will win through better health outcomes for lower
costs.
Historically, cost-effectiveness analyses and cost-utility analyses have been per-
formed to examine the costs and outcomes of alternative medical strategies or
programs. Even though there are similarities among cost-effectiveness analyses,
cost-utility analyses, and value-based healthcare delivery, the first two are usually
used to compare alternative programs with common health outcomes or to assess
the consequences of expanding a program, but the latter intends to derive bet-
ter health outcomes while minimizing the costs by requiring changes in different
pillars of healthcare delivery, including organizational structure, outcome mea-
surement, and reimbursement systems. Value-based healthcare delivery reform
requires changes to the structure of the healthcare delivery so health outcomes
could be defined around patient needs. Outcomes are multidimensional, and they
are comprised of survival, extent of recovery or functionality restored, mistakes,
complications, recovery time, patient’s experience, and other aspects of a patient’s
health.
Michael Porter suggests that for specialty care, outcomes should be measured
for each medical condition or set of interrelated patient medical circumstances,
such as asthma, diabetes, or breast cancer [5]. A medical condition encompasses
common complications, coexisting or co-occurring conditions. For primary and
preventive care, outcomes should be measured for defined patient populations
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with similar health circumstances, such as healthy adults, disabled elderly people,
or adults with defined sets of chronic conditions. Furthermore, the outcomes that
matter are the results of care over the disease cycle, rather than only results of an
individual intervention or a single visit.
In the current healthcare delivery structure, providers can only measure what
they can directly control in a particular intervention and what is easily measured
rather than what matters for health outcomes. As a result, health outcomes are
measured for providers, departments, or billing units rather than for the full cycle
of care. If the healthcare delivery structure changes to a multidisciplinary group
of providers for a medical condition, called Integrated Practice Unit (hereafter,
IPU), then providers are able to jointly accept the responsibility for outcomes.
To incentivize providers to work in the proposed organizational structure and
be accountable for health outcomes over the care cycle, payment systems should
be modified. It is not usually feasible for the purchaser to determine in advance
precise levels of all the aspects of care for every condition. It is also not possible
to determine the delivery specifications have met ex post or not. The terminology
used in literature is that the IPU’s efforts are unverifiable to a third party. In
this case, IPU’s actions are hidden from the purchaser. The hidden action is also
known as moral hazard [24]. Similar to Chalkley et al. [19] we use the term con-
tract to refer to any arrangement for payment between the healthcare purchaser
and the IPU. We assume the government is the healthcare purchaser with the
objective of maximizing health outcomes while containing the costs. The contract
that can coordinate the healthcare purchaser-IPU relationship will be called the
“optimal contract” or “coordinating contract”. In other words, coordinating con-
tract is a contract that allow each party to optimize their objective function while
maximizing the social welfare.
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Several payment options have been proposed and implemented for healthcare
systems over the past few decades. These payment systems affect physicians be-
havior, the quality of care received by patients, and healthcare costs. The current
payment systems do not target quality of care and cost reducing efforts simultane-
ously. Fee-for-service payment could result in inefficiencies by providing financial
incentives for the physicians to encourage overprovision of care [10]. Alternative
payment system that can control the costs is capitation. However, with capitation
payment scheme the provider’s income depends on the assigned patient popula-
tion’s healthcare usage, capitation might result in less accessible care or less than
efficient quality of care [2].
In this chapter, we study the coordinating contract between a healthcare pur-
chaser and an IPU over the care cycle under dynamic hidden action. This research
belongs to the rich literature on the continuous-time dynamic hidden action (moral
hazard) problem. Our main contribution is to capture the health outcomes over
the care cycle and link the payments to the history of health outcomes by using a
continuous-time dynamic principal-agent model. We assume the IPU is protected
by limited liability, but assumed to be risk-neutral. The IPU’s efforts affect the
health outcomes by modifying the probability of failures. High quality treatment
is costly to the IPU and unverifiable to the purchaser.
The optimal payments to the IPU should be a function of the entire history
of health outcomes. Using a continuous-time dynamic principal-agent model, we
are able to summarize this complex history dependence by one state variable:
continuation value of the IPU. Continuation value reflects the likelihood of future
payments to the IPU and its evolution is the mirror of health outcome dynamics.
As a result, continuation value could serve as IPU’s track record.
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The results suggest that the purchaser can motivate the IPU by promising a
lump sum money transfer after a good performance record and also by threatening
to reduce his continuation value after failures. The magnitude of the reduction in
the IPU’s continuation value is determined based on the incentive compatibility
constraint. The more serious the hidden action problem is, the greater the reduc-
tion in the continuation value. With this mechanism, IPU’s continuation value
will be sensitive to the failures. Additionally, the healthcare purchaser’s value
function is concave in the IPU’s continuation value and, consequently, punishing
the IPU by decreasing his continuation value is costly for the purchaser. We show
that it is socially optimal to set the reduction of the IPU’s continuation value to
the minimum level, consistent with the incentive compatibility constraint.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We review the related
literature in the next section. We detail the model and formulate a principal-
agent model to determine a set of incentive-compatible coordinating contracts to
be offered to the IPU in §3.3. We characterize the optimal contract and explain
its implementation in §3.4, and discuss future extensions and conclusions in §3.5.
3.2 Literature Review
This research connects the literature on healthcare contracting and continuous-
time dynamic principal-agent models. The literature on the healthcare contracts
have been reviewed in Chapter 2. Here we highlight important features and short-
comings of the current popular payment schemes including fee-for-service, capita-
tion, and pay-for-performance.
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Payment scheme, such as fee-for-service, is easy to implement and manage, but
can be a source of inefficiency in the system since the scheme only rewards the
volume of care and not the health outcomes associated with it. Empirical evidence
suggest physicians that are paid by fee-for-service provide more consultation and
order more diagnostic tests than the physicians that are not paid by fee-for-service
[10].
While a capitation payment scheme encourages physicians to keep their pa-
tients healthy, it creates incentives for physicians to systematically select patients
who are healthier and require less care in the future. Further, capitation payments
mainly cover primary care services and exclude specialty or hospital care. As a
result, if a primary care physician refers a patient to a specialist or to a hospital,
the primary care physician can keep the capitation fee and not need to provide
the care. Physicians may underreport patients’ illness to them or even not reveal
all possible treatments [43, 44]. This may lead to inefficiently low levels of care.
None of these two payment schemes, i.e. fee-for-service and capitation, incentivize
physicians to improve health outcomes, which is the what patients and policy-
makers want. Not surprisingly the issues of poor health outcomes are ample in
healthcare systems. Unacceptable health outcomes and increasing healthcare ex-
penditures are pushing governments to examine quality and provide suggestions
for its improvement [14, 16].
In response to quality issues, changes to the payment systems have been pro-
posed to reward appropriate and high-quality care. This type of payment system
is known as pay-for-performance. Proposals for implementing pay-for-performance
payment systems vary from rewarding the providers for their processes (how things
are done) to the patients’ health outcomes (the effectiveness of treatments). De-
spite promising values of pay-for-performance systems, their implementation faces
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several significant challenges [12]. Among these challenges is the problem of “mul-
titasking,” that is if the providers face several tasks and their resources are lim-
ited, then their effort will be allocated toward explicitly rewarded tasks. Tying
remuneration to processes is administratively easy to implement, but might create
unwanted results by encouraging the providers to concentrate on the processes
that are targeted and ignore the processes that are not. On the other hand, pay-
for-performance payments tied to patients’ outcomes are not easy to implement.
First, measuring health outcomes is not trivial. Second, in the current healthcare
delivery structure, there is no way to isolate individual provider’s contribution to
the patients’ health outcomes [2].
This research contributes to the body of healthcare contracting by designing a
dynamic contract between the healthcare purchaser and team of providers whom
are collectively responsible for the health outcomes of patients over the care cy-
cle. Several authors have captured the importance of using dynamic contracts.
Among these, Radner [45] shows it is possible to achieve efficiency in long-term
contracts by aggregating outcomes over several periods. The aggregation would
allow to form better statistics about the agent’s efforts, only if the agent becomes
more patient. In another study, Fudenberg et al. [46] show in several settings,
it is possible to use agent’s wealth as a proxy for agent’s performance history to
implement the optimal contract. The insight from these studies suggest that a
firm’s financial slack can summarize past performance. The firm’s management
team is typically modeled as one agent. Our study similarly models the IPU as
one agent in the principal-agent model.
Characterization of the optimal contracts in dynamic settings is a challenging
task. Describing the state of the problem is complex. The agent’s compensation
can be a function of entire performance history. Furthermore, the principal-agent
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problem is composed of one dynamic optimization problem embedded in another.
The principal is optimizing her objective, realizing that the agent is looking for
the optimum dynamic effort strategy to maximize his objective as well. Our re-
search belongs to the growing literature on dynamic hidden action (moral hazard)
problems that employs recursive techniques.
Solving a discrete-time dynamic principal-agent model problem is a daunting
task and requires several assumptions to derive tractable results. In the context
of healthcare delivery, Fuloria et al. [27], find an outcome-adjusted payment that
maximizes societal welfare. Such payment schemes can potentially make signifi-
cant improvements, however the implementation of the resulted contract requires
accurate information about the treatment technology, patient characteristics, and
the provider preferences [27]. In that paper, Fuloria and colleagues assume the
patient will be treated out of the system for any occurrences of complications.
Moreover, to derive a tractable solution they make several assumptions such as
exponential utility function and unrestricted access to a bank for the provider. In
contrast, the method we use to characterize the optimal dynamic contract origi-
nates from the literature on continuous-time contracting, specially [47] and [48].
In continuous-time the solution can be characterized by ordinary differential equa-
tions, using optimal stochastic control. This method benefits from tractability, due
to the differential equation that characterizes the optimal contract, and comput-
ing power. Continuous-time principal-agent model has been extensively studied
in corporate finance applications, for examples see [49–52].
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3.3 The Model
Health could be broadly defined as longevity and illness-free days in a given year
[6]. Good health has positive social value for two reasons. First, health provides
positive utility for patients. Second, better health increases the total amount of
time available for market and nonmarket activities [6]. Health outcomes depend
on many factors, including medical care. Grossman defines “The Human Capital
Model” to demonstrate the importance of many inputs that go into the production
of health along with medical care. He relates the output of health to choice
variables like diet, exercise, medical care utilization, healthy habits, education,
and also the medical care the patient receives from the providers [6].
In our model we will control for the patient risk factors. We assume the IPU
is treating a homogeneous patient population. Furthermore, we are assuming the
population benefits from a universal health insurance and if they need care there
are no monetary obstacles for utilizing the health services. Therefore, we will
assume the health outcomes critically depend on the appropriateness or quality
of the care provided. Appropriateness of care can have many aspects, including
receiving the right medical treatment and being treated in an understanding way
[19]. In the literature, terms like intensity or quality have been used to capture
the concept of appropriateness. In this chapter, we will refer to all these aspects
of care as quality of service. Quality of service is defined as any aspect of service
that benefits the patients whether during the process of treatment or after the
treatment.
There are two players in this problem, the healthcare purchaser and the IPU.
Recall that an IPU is a team of providers formed around medical conditions to
provide all the necessary care and is accountable for the health outcomes of a
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patient during the disease care cycle. A medical condition is an interrelated set of
patient medical circumstances that includes common co-occurring conditions and
complications, and requires multiple specialties and services to best address the
disease from the patient’s perspective. We will assume that an IPU has unique
necessary skills to treat the patients. However, treatments are costly and the
IPU has limited liability. By contrast, government as the healthcare purchaser
has unlimited liability and is able to cover the costs. The two players are risk-
neutral. Time is continuous and treatments are provided over the care cycle, T .
The purchaser discounts the future payoffs at rate r and the IPU discounts the
future payoffs at rate γ > r, i.e. IPU is less patient than the purchaser. This
assumption rules out the possibility of indefinitely postponing the payments to
the IPU. Without loss of generality, we normalize the fixed cost of forming an IPU
to 0.
Health outcomes are the results of care in terms of patients’ health over time.
They are different than the care process designed to achieve the results and the
biologic indicators that predict the results [5]. Health outcome has been defined
as survival, prevention of illness, early detection, right diagnosis, right treatment
to the right patient, fewer avoidable complications, greater functionality, slower
disease progression, and less care induced illnesses [5].
Although we are aware of the multi-dimensionality of the health outcome, in
this research we will focus on one of its dimensions to demonstrate the coordinating
contract between the purchaser and the IPU that can improve value provision.
Similar to Grossman [6], we will use the “number of illness-free days in a given
year” as the indicator of health outcomes.
We assume the IPU is treating a homogenous patient population with similar
risk factors and thus we can fairly assume the value of functional days in dollars
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Figure 3.1: Problem state: patient status (W or U), number of failures (m),
and number of successes (n); probability of failure is denoted by pi
for each patient is µ, where µ > 0 is a constant. We define the health status of a
patient either as being “well” or “unwell”. The success of the IPU is defined as
keeping the patient in the “well” state or bringing them back to the “well” state
and the failure as being in the “unwell” state or transitioning back to the “unwell”
health status.
The IPU can mitigate the risk of failures by choosing the quality of treatment,
at. For simplicity, we will only consider two levels of quality, high and low, respec-
tively denoted by aHand aL. When high quality care is provided, the probability of
failure is denoted by pH and when low quality treatment is provided the probability
of failure is denoted by pL. Assuming that attentive care reduces the probability
of failure then pH < pL. The transition between problem states is shown in figure
3.1. The problem state is comprised of the patient health status (being “well” or
“unwell” denoted by W or U , respectively), the number of failures is denoted by
m, and the number of successes is denoted by n. The probability of failure and
success for the IPU is denoted by pi and 1− pi, respectively where i ∈ {H,L}.
This construction helps us to connect the number of successes for the IPU to
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the number of illness-free days for the patient. Since success for the IPU is the
number of illness-free days for the patient, next we will reduce the problem state
to the number of failures for the IPU.
The occurrence of failures is modeled as a point process N = {Nt}t≥0, where
for each t, Nt is the number of failures up to and including time t. The healthcare
delivery failures impose two types of costs to the society. First, any complication
and illness needs to be treated by the providers, whom will use valuable resources
and capacity to serve the patients suffering from complications. Furthermore, there
are costs tied to the lost working days. As a result, the number of complications
can represent the inefficiencies in the healthcare system. We will assume the cost
of health failure is C. Because of the limited liability, the IPU cannot be held
responsible for costs exceeding his wealth. As a result, the purchaser incurs the
complication costs and the net value of health outcome during the infinitesimal
time interval (t, t+ dt]: µdt− CdNt.
We assume the IPU incurs a constant cost per unit of time, h. As a result,
the total cost for treatments will be denoted with haH and haL for providing high
quality and low quality treatments, respectively. The IPU can save h(aH − aL) if
he choose low treatments over high treatments.
Throughout this chapter we assume that
µ− pHC > 0 (3.1)
and that
(pL − pH)C > h(aH − aL) (3.2)
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The left-hand side of (3.1) is the net expected health outcome value when IPU
exerts high quality treatment. Condition (3.1) implies that a high quality treat-
ment has positive net present value. We will focus on the case when the IPU’s
treatment choice is not verifiable but the health outcomes and costs are common
information. Hence we are dealing with the hidden action problem. The left-hand
side of (3.2) is the expected social cost of increased risk when IPU provides low
quality treatment instead of high quality treatment. The right-hand side of (3.2)
is the cost savings from providing low quality treatments. Condition (3.2) implies
that in the absence of hidden action problem, it is socially optimal to require the
IPU to provide high quality treatment.
The larger the cost savings from providing low quality treatment h(aH − aL)
is, the more attractive it is for the IPU to shirk. The lower pL − pH is, the
more strenuous it is to detect shirking. The contract between the healthcare
purchaser and IPU is designed and agreed on at time 0. The IPU then chooses
the treatment strategy process A = {at}t≥0. We assume both purchaser and IPU
can fully commit to a long-term contract. Our assumption about limited liability
is in line with DeMarzo and Sannikov [49], Sannikov [47], and Biais et al. [51]
where limited liability reduces the ability to punish the agent. This encourages
the prinicipal to replace punishments by actions. In this problem, we will assume
the contract can be terminated as a result of steady adverse health outcomes. The
stopping time or termination time will be represented by τ . We allow τ ≤ T ,
where T is the care cycle.
A contract specifies payments to the IPU and termination decision as functions
of the history of past health outcomes. The cumulative money transfers to the
IPU is nonnegative and increasing. The money transfers will be denoted by the
process S = {st}t≥0 and st = 0 for all t > τ .
Chapter 3 60
At anytime t prior to termination, the sequence of events during the infinites-
imal time interval (t, t+ dt] can be described as follows:
1. The IPU takes her treatment strategy decision ait, where i ∈ {H,L}.
2. With probability pidt, there is a failure, in which case dNt = 1; otherwise
dNt = 0.
3. The IPU receives a nonnegative money transfer dst.
4. The treatments are either terminated or continued.
The payment and termination decisions are taken after observing the health
outcomes. Formally, S is FN -adapted and τ is an FN -stopping time, where FN =
{FNt }t≥0 is the filtration generated by N .1 Informally, Martingale is a stochastic
process defined on a probability space whose predicted value at any future time
u > t is the same as its present value at time t of prediction. The filtration FNt
contains all the information generated by N up to time t in an increasing sequence.
A random variable S is called adapted to FN , if it “casually” depends on N [54].
This means that at each time t, S depends on the observation of the process N
at time t. Lastly, τ is called an FN -stopping time if the decision to terminate the
process or not depends on the information available from N at time t.
An effort process A will generate a unique probability distribution and we will
use the expected payoffs for each player to demonstrate the dynamic principal-
agent model. Next we will explain the objective function for the IPU and health-
care purchaser.
1For definitions of these concepts, for instance see [53] Chapter IV, Definitions 12, 49, and
61.
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3.3.1 Objective Functions and the Contract Space
Given a contract Γ = (S, τ) and a treatment process A, the expected discounted
payoff for the IPU is
E
[∫ τ
0
e−γt(dst − hatdt)
]
(3.3)
while the expected discounted payoff of the purchaser is
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(µdt− CdNt − dst)
]
(3.4)
Treatment strategy A is incentive compatible with respect to contract Γ if it
maximizes the IPU’s expected payoff (3.3). The healthcare purchaser’s problem
is to find a contract Γ and an incentive compatible treatment strategy A that
maximizes expected discounted payoff (3.4), subject to fulfilling the IPU’s required
expected discounted payoff level. We will focus on the contracts Γ such that the
present value of payments to the IPU is finite, that is
E
[∫ τ
0
e−γtdst
]
<∞ (3.5)
Constraint (3.5) would assure the purchaser’s expected discounted payoff is not
infinitely negative.
3.3.2 Incentive Compatibility Constraint
Similar to the techniques introduced by Sannikov [47], we will employ martingale
techniques to characterize the incentive compatibility constraint. We will similarly
utilize the notion of continuation value for the IPU. Using the agent’s continuation
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value as a state variable is common technique in dynamic principal-agent models,
see e.g. Spear and Srivastava [55] for an illustration.
The IPU will evaluate how the treatment strategy will affect her continuation
value when taking a decision at time t. The IPU’s continuation value is defined as
wt(Γ, A) = E
[∫ τ
t
e−γ(u−t)(dsu − haudu)|FNt
]
(3.6)
Denote by W (Γ, A) = {wt(Γ, A)}t≥0 the IPU’s continuation value process. Since
W (Γ, A) reflects whether there was a failure at time t, it is FN -adapted. To
characterize the evolution of IPU’s expected value, we will first consider his life
time expected payoff, evaluated conditionally on the information available at time
t, that is,
vt(Γ, A) = E
[∫ τ
0
e−γ(u)(dsu − haudu)|FNt
]
=
∫ t
0
e−γu(dsu − haudu) + e−γtwt.
(3.7)
Since vt(Γ, A) is the expectation of a random variable conditional on FNt , the
process V (Γ, A) = {vt(Γ, A)}t≥0 is an FN -martingale. Next, we will introduce a
notation MAt that will represent the number of failures up to and including time
t, minus its expectations.
MAt = Nt −
∫ t
0
pidu (3.8)
Since the occurrence of failures is modeled as a point process, according to a basic
result from the theory of point processes MA is an FN -martingale as well. The
martingale representation theorem for point processes then implies the following
lemma.
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Lemma 3.1. The martingale vt(Γ, A) satisfies
vt(Γ, A) = v0(Γ, A)−
∫ t
0
e−γuψu(Γ, A)dMAu (3.9)
for all t ≥ 0, for some FN -predictable process Ψ = {ψt(Γ, A)}t≥0.
Lemma (3.1) along with (3.8) suggest that the lifetime expected value of the
IPU evolves in response to the jumps of the process N . The term −dMAt reflects
the failures occurring at time t, the difference between the instantaneous proba-
bility of a failure pidt and the instantaneous change in the total number of failures
dNt, which is equal to 0 or 1. As a result, −e−γtψt(Γ, A)dMAt can be interpreted
as a function of past, in which ψt(Γ, A) is the sensitivity of IPU’s continuation
value to the failures.
Lemma (3.1) reflects the fact that at any time t, the change in vt(Γ, A) is equal
to −e−γtψt(Γ, A)dMAt . Equations (3.7) and (3.9) imply that the IPU’s continua-
tion value evolves according to
dwt(Γ, A) =
(
γwt(Γ, A) + ha
i
t
)
dt+ ψt(Γ, A)(p
idt− dNt)− dst (3.10)
for all t ∈ [o, τ). Equation (3.10) explains the expected instantaneous change in the
IPU’s continuation value. Since the parameter ψt is measuring the sensitivity of
the IPU’s continuation value to the failures, whenever the health outcomes features
an unexpected failure dMt, the IPU’s continuation value changes by ψtdMt. We
can think of wt as what the purchaser owes to the IPU. Using a similar analysis
to Sannikov [47], we have
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Proposition 3.1. Given the contract Γ = (S, τ), a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the treatment strategy aH to be incentive compatible is that
ψ(Γ, A) ≥ `, (3.11)
for all t ∈ [0, τ), where ` = haH−aL
pL−pH .
Equation (3.10) shows that the IPU’s continuation value will be instanta-
neously reduced by an amount ψt(Γ, A) if there is an unanticipated failure. With
this explanation, Proposition 3.1 states that to induce high quality treatments the
reduction in the IPU’s continuation value should be greater than the cost savings
that the IPU can generate by shirking. Furthermore, because of the limited li-
ability constraint, the IPU’s continuation value must remain nonnegative. The
continuation value of the IPU before observing the events at time t, wt−(Γ, A)
should be greater than the loss in case of failure ψt(Γ, A), therefore
wt−(Γ, A) ≥ ψt(Γ, A) (3.12)
for all time t ∈ [o, τ). To simplify the notation, we drop the arguments Γ and A
in the remainder of the chapter.
3.4 The Coordinating Contract
In this section, we characterize the optimal contract that induces high quality
treatment, that is A = aH for all t ∈ [0, τ). The optimal contract maximizes
the expected value for the purchaser from an incentive compatible contract to
implement a high quality treatment strategy.
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This section will offer more precise insights on how to induce high quality treat-
ments that will result in better health outcomes at minimal cost. The contract
that we derive can be described based on the continuation value of an IPU, re-
flecting future payment decisions. We will first provide the heuristic derivation of
the purchaser’s value function and the main properties of the optimal contract.
Then we will show the formal derivation of the value function and optimal contract
characteristics. All the proofs are provided in Appendix 3.A.
3.4.1 Properties of the Optimal Contract
Since the healthcare purchaser strives to maximize the value of health outcomes
subject to the IPU’s incentive compatibility constraint, formally we have
J(w) = max
{ψt,st,τ}
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(µ− cdNt − dst)|F0
]
dwt =
(
γwt + hat + ψtp
h
)
dt− dst − ψtdNt
ψt ≥ `
(3.13)
We will first characterize the healthcare purchaser’s continuation value J(w)
which is a function of the state of the problem, the IPU’s continuation value w.
Since the purchaser discounts the future payoffs at rate r, the expected flow of
value at time t is given by rJ(w). This should be equal to the sum of the expected
instantaneous value of health outcomes and the expected rate of change in the
principal’s continuation value. The former is the expected health outcomes minus
the expected payments to the IPU, which is
µ− pHC − dst. (3.14)
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To construct the expected rate of change in the purchaser’s continuation value,
we use the dynamics of the IPU’s continuation value (3.10) and set A = aH . The
purchaser’s continuation value satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
rJ(w) = sup
st,ψt
(µ− pHC − dst)
+ [γw−t + ha
H + pHψt − dst]Jw(w−t )
− pH [J(w−t )− J(w−t − ψt)]),
(3.15)
where the maximization is over the set of controls (st, ψt) that satisfies constraint
(3.11). The first term arises since the purchaser is maximizing the current payoff,
the second term corresponds to the drift of the IPU’s continuation value, and the
third term reflects the possibility of jumps in the purchaser’s continuation value
due to the failures. In this part we require J to be globally concave: proposition 3.2
and the proofs will formally establish this property for the purchaser’s continuation
value.
We can derive several properties of the optimal control using the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation (3.15). The concavity of J also implies that it is optimal
to let ψt be as low as possible in (3.15). Consequently, including the incentive
compatibility condition for the IPU (3.11) leads to the first property of the optimal
contract.
Property 3.1. The sensitivity to failures of the IPU’s continuation value is given
by
ψt = ` (3.16)
Based on the concavity of the purchaser’s continuation value, condition (3.16)
reflects that it is optimal to expose the IPU to the minimal risk ψt = `.
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Optimizing Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (3.15) with respect to dst yields
to
J ′(w) ≥ −1, (3.17)
where equality occurs at dst > 0. Intuitively, J
′(w) is the increase in the pur-
chaser’s continuation value due to a marginal increase in the IPU’s continuation
value, while the right-hand side of (3.17) is the marginal cost for the purchaser
to make an immediate money transfer to the IPU. Thus it is optimal to delay
the payments as long as the inequality (3.17) strictly holds. This reflects that
the purchaser will benefit more from increases in w than transferring immediate
money to the IPU. The concavity of J(w) implies that condition (3.17) will hold
when wt is below a threshold. We will denote this threshold with w
p. The optimal
contract satisfies the next property.
Property 3.2. The payments to the IPU are made only if wt exceeds the threshold
wp, which satisfies the following condition
J ′(w) = −1. (3.18)
This threshold and the concavity of J(w) suggest that the purchaser will pro-
vide incentives to the IPU contingent on the record of good performance. The
optimal contract includes a lump sum payment of w − wp, when w > wp. Thus
the money transfers are
dst = max(w − wp, 0). (3.19)
To incentivize high quality treatment, the IPU’s continuation value will be
reduced by an amount that is proportional to the cost savings from shirking. To
clarify this, suppose at the beginning of time t the continuation value of the IPU is
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wt− . If there is a failure at time t, the IPU’s continuation value should be reduced
from wt− to wt = wt− − ψt. This results to the third property of the contract.
Property 3.3. Whenever the continuation value wt drops to zero, the contract
will be terminated.
Next, we will show that the above properties are consistent with the formal
derivation of the optimal contract. First, we will establish there is a function
J that fits the properties discribed above, then we will characterize the optimal
contract.
Proposition 3.2. The Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equation
rJ(w) = µ− pHC + (γw + pH`+ haH)J ′(w)− pH [J(w)− J(w − `)],
with the threshold wp, which is endogenously determined according to
J ′(w) = −1,
has a concave solution and equals the purchaser’s optimal value function.
The concavity of J(w) was the essential to characterizing the properties of
the optimal contract. The next step is to show that the function formulated in
Proposition 3.2 will lead to the maximal value for the purchaser and also implement
the optimal contract. For this, we will fix the initial expected continuation value
for the IPU to w0 and consider {wt}t≥0 continuation value of the IPU and {st}t≥0
cumulative money transfers up to and including time t, respectively, to be solutions
to
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wt = w0 +
∫ t−
0
(γwu + ha
H + `pH)du− `dNu − dsu, (3.20)
st = (w0 − wp) ∨ 0 +
∫ t−
0
(γwp + haH + `pH)1{wu+=wp}du (3.21)
for all t ≥ 0, where w0 is the initial expected value for the IPU and wp is defined
in Proposition 3.2.2
Proposition 3.3. The optimal contract Γ = (S, τ) that motivates high quality
treatments and delivers the IPU the initial expected discounted value w0 satisfies
properties (1-3). At any time t,
i If w > wp a lump sum transfer of w − wp is paid to the IPU.
ii As long as wt = w
p and no failure occurs, money transfers to the IPU is equal
to the increase in the continuation value γwp + haH + `pH .
iii Occurrence of failure will reduce the IPU’s continuation value by `.
iv The IPU will be terminated when the continuation value is wt = 0, which is
stochastic and unpredictable.
The features of the optimal contract are in line with the properties described
before. To keep the social value at its maximum J(wp) + wp, lump sum money
transfer will occur when wt > w
p. The purchaser will transfer γwp + haH + `pH
to the IPU as long as wt = w
p and no failure occurs. This term can be seen in
equation (3.10) and is equal to the increase in the IPU’s continuation value when
dNt = 0.
Using the results of the propositions, we will discuss one of the possible contract
implementations. Recall that w can be considered as the amount of money the
2For each x and y, we denote by x ∨ y the maximum of x and y.
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purchaser owes to the IPU. Starting at time 0, the purchaser and IPU agree on
a contract based on the initial expected value for the IPU w0. If w0 exceeds w
p
the IPU will be paid the lump sum money transfer of w0 − wp. Since wp is where
the social value will be maximized, maximum of J(w) +w, the purchaser wants to
keep the continuation value at wp. Assuming w as the amount of credit the IPU
has with the purchaser, the IPU can withdraw money from the credit line up to w.
Good performance will increase w by γw+haH + `pH . Optimizing the care results
in lower costs and better health outcomes, and thus increases IPU’s continuation
value. When continuation value exceeds wp, lump sum money transfer will occur.
As a result, the characterized optimal contract in this research incentivizes the IPU
to invest in cost reducing efforts while providing high quality care to the patient.
Furthermore, the possibility of punishment by decreasing the continuation value
is another source of incentive for the IPU to provide high quality treatments to
the patient. Any adverse health outcomes will decrease w by ` and also the the
contract will be terminated when the IPU maxes out the credit limit, when w = 0.
3.5 Conclusions
We studied the contracts that coordinate the healthcare purchaser-IPU relation-
ship in the context of value-based healthcare delivery. Coordinating contracts
allow the IPU to optimize its objective while maximizing the societal welfare. We
considered the hidden action problem, in which the IPU’s treatment strategy is
unverifiable to the purchaser. To capture the dynamics of health outcomes over
the care cycle we used a continuous-time dynamic principal-agent model to derive
the optimal contract. This technique allows us to link the payments to the history
of health outcomes.
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Failure in healthcare delivery affects patients’ health outcomes. Failures are
expensive, not only because patients have to go through costly treatments but
also they lose functional days. Accountability for avoidable complications is one
of the ways value-based healthcare delivery is intending to reduce inefficiencies in
the healthcare system. Our analysis suggests that, in order to prevent healthcare
failures, compensation policies should be made contingent on the accumulated
performance. We used the concept of continuation value previously used in the
continuous-time principal-agent problem in several contexts. Continuation value
can be interpreted as the IPU’s track record. Accumulated good performance will
result in positive money transfers, and failures will reduce the compensation.
Our research contributes to the literature of healthcare contracting in several
ways. First, it closes the gap in designing a dynamic incentive contract in the
healthcare delivery context. Current payment systems like fee-for-service reim-
burse the providers for discrete services and can encourage providers to overprovide
services. However, to add value for the patients the providers should evaluate if the
additional test or treatment can create better health outcomes or not. Alternative
payment system like capitation can control the increasing healthcare expenditures,
but might incentivize the providers to underprovide services or pick the healthy
patients that will require less care. On the other hand, current healthcare deliv-
ery structure does not let the providers to leverage the wisdom other providers
might have acquired on the patient’s condition. The value-based healthcare deliv-
ery brings all the providers that determine the well-being of a patient with certain
medical condition together in an IPU. Since the IPU’s treatment strategy stochas-
tically affects the health outcomes over time, we need a model that considers the
health outcomes over the care cycle and evaluates the IPU based on that. We de-
termined a payment arrangement that encourages the IPU to provide high quality
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treatments to the patients with a given budget. Good performance record for
the IPU will be reimbursed by a bonus payment. This is a significant contribution
because most of the existing payment systems that link the payment to the perfor-
mance, pay for fulfilling some targeted processes. Paying for processes might not
result in better health outcomes. Additionally, pay-for-Performance systems that
pay for outcomes are challenging to implement in the current structure. When
healthcare providers work individually, they cannot be held accountable for the
health outcomes. Each provider can argue the other providers involved in the
well-being of a patient have not provided good quality of care.
Second, our research mathematically demonstrates what is the optimal pay-
ment system in the value-based delivery context. Michael porter argues that
a bundled payment should coordinate the relationship between the healthcare
purchaser-IPU relationship [20]. But, we find that other than the bundled pay-
ment, IPU should be compensated with a bonus when they achieve superior per-
formance. Basically, the payment to the IPU should be adjusted based on the
health outcomes.
Third, our way of characterizing the optimal contract can arguably result
in straightforward implementation. The use of continuous-time principal-agent
model helped us to model the problem with minimal assumptions and devised
us with great technical tool to summarize IPU’s track over the care cycle. Cost-
reducing efforts and value-adding treatments increase the IPU’s continuation value,
which can eventually result in the bonus payments if they exceed a certain thresh-
old for the continuation value. Thus, our proposed payment scheme can fulfill the
tenets of value-based healthcare delivery by acting as the source of incentive for
the IPU to improve the health outcomes and minimize the costs at the same time.
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Our model can be extended to include the possibility of learning throughout
time for the IPU. Learning could provide cost-reducing opportunities and thus effi-
ciently providing care to the patients. The implications of learning in value-based
healthcare delivery on the payment systems is interesting to study. Further, the
model could be modified for specific diseases. Particularly, terminally ill patients
have distinct health evolution.
Alternatively, optimal design of non-financial incentives among the IPUs could
be studied. If different IPUs could be rated in comparison to their peers, they
might behave differently. As a result, the healthcare purchaser could benefit from
building in social comparisons or peer pressure into their mechanisms.
3.A Appendix: Chapter 3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Condition (3.9) is the predictable representation of mar-
tingale vt(Γ, A), following from Bre´maud (Chapter III, Theorems T9 and T17)
[54].
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let v′t represent the IPU’s lifetime expected value, given
the information available at time t, when he uses and alternative treatment strat-
egy A′ = {a′t = aL}t≥0 until time t and then changing the treatments to A = {at =
aH}t≥0, as a result:
v′t(Γ, A
′) =
∫ t
0
e−γu(dsu − ha′udu) + e−γtwt(Γ, A), (3.22)
Similar to Sannikov [47] and Biais et. al [51], it is straightforward to show that if
ψ ≥ `, where ` = haH−aL
pL−pH , the drift of the process is going to be nonpositive for all
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t and thus v′t is supermartingale for any alternative strategy A
′. As a result, the
strategy A is at least as good as the alternative strategy A′.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. First, we will establish the existence of a twice differ-
ntiable solution to the Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Belllman (HJB) equation (3.15). As-
sumption (3.1), implies that the purchaser wants to avoid health failures at the
first best solution.
rJ(w) = µ− pHC + (γw + haH)J ′(w) + pH [J(w)− J(w − `)] (3.23)
Let’s define function H as
H(w, u, s) = −min (ru− µ+ pHC − s(γw + haH)− pH [u(w)− u(w − `))
therefore, the HJB is equivalent to
H(w, u, s) = 0 (3.24)
By Berge’s Maximum Theorem, H(w, u, s) is jointly continuous in its parame-
ters. This implies that for any slope m, the initial value problem with boundary
conditions J(0) = 0 and J ′(w) = m has a continuous differentiable solution on
its domain. Furthermore, since the HJB equation is the sufficient condition for
optimality any candidate function that solves the HJB, is indeed optimal.
Denote by J(W) the purchaser’s highest value from a contract that provides the
IPU the continuation value of W . Since the purchaser has the option of providing
W to the IPU by paying a lump-sum transfer of ds > 0 and moving to the optimal
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contract of W − ds, the following condition must hold
J(W ) ≥ J(W − ds)− ds (3.25)
which implies that J ′(w) ≥ −1 for all w. Condition (3.25) along with rJ(w) <
µ− pHC − (γw+ pH`+ haH) imply that J ′′ < 0. Therefore, to the left of wp with
boundary condition J ′(wp) = −1 and rJ(wp) = µ− pHC − (γwp + pH`+ haH),
function J is concave.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. The proposed contract generates continuation value that
satisfies (3.10), with A = aHand ψt = `. Therefore, by Proposition 3.1 induces high
quality treatments. From Proposition 3.2 and the boundary condition for J(w),
the threshold that puchaser’s value is maximized is wp. When w > wp because of
the concavity of the J(w) the purchaser is better off to pay a lump sum money of
wt −wp reduce the amount of money they owe to the IPU to wp. From equations
(3.20) and (3.21), it can be seen that when IPU is performing well the continuation
value increases, which might result in lump sum money transfers to the IPU. As
far as there is no failures the IPU’s continuation value will not be altered and
payment is equal to the increase in the continuation value, st = γw
p + haH + `pH ,
w will stay constant at wp since dwt = 0.
Chapter 4
Healthcare Providers in an
Integrated Practice Unit:
Modeling Partnerships
4.1 Introduction
A focused and disciplined team has been defined as the organizational unit that
can tackle both performance targets and complex changing environment challenges
[56]. Teams exist in almost all business and professional environments, including
car manufacturing, professional sports, and military. The value of teams is even
more evident when the performance requires multiple skills, judgments, and expe-
riences [56]. Nonetheless, not all teams reach their goals. Successful teams have
a common purpose, an agreement on performance goals, and a common work-
ing approach. In these teams, members develop complementary skills and hold
themselves accountable for the achievements [57].
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Interdisciplinary teams have been recognized as the success factor for deliv-
ering health services [14]. Improved teamwork and collaborative care have been
shown to improve healthcare delivery in many aspects, including quality of care
and patient safety. It has also been shown that the teamwork can significantly in-
crease job satisfaction and reduce patient morbidity [58, 59]. Despite the promising
tenets of team-based healthcare delivery, building and maintaining effective team-
work is challenging. The challenges include lack of common definition of team and
teamwork, organizational factors affecting teamwork, and current policies and reg-
ulations. The successful implementation of team-based delivery in healthcare de-
pends on the existence of a common purpose, good communication, coordination,
performance goals, working approach, complementary skills, and responsibility.
The primary care reform and the integrated client care project (ICCP) are two
recent collaborative programs that have been introduced in Canada in order to
shift to teams of providers who are accountable for providing comprehensive ser-
vices to their clients. Other countries have introduced similar programs. Likewise
the value-based healthcare delivery, which is the basis of the aforementioned re-
forms in Canada, requires a collaborative relationship between providers involved
in the Integrated Practice Unit (IPU).
In the value-based healthcare delivery, each provider has comparative special-
ties in understanding different aspects of the patient’s problems and technical
capabilities in providing the service. All engaged providers assist the others in un-
derstanding the disease, planning and executing the care. They also may share in-
frastructure for providing the integrated care. The health outcomes of the patients
then depend on the attentive and persistence efforts of all healthcare providers in-
volved. Each healthcare provider can observe the outcome of the care process, but
cannot verify the actions taken by the other providers.
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When multiple agents are involved in taking hidden actions, they may not
pay thorough attention to the unobservable actions because the costs and ben-
efits would be shared among all agents [37]. In the healthcare delivery con-
text, the stochasticity of health outcomes aggravates the hidden action problem.
Each provider knows he can declare the unsatisfactory outcome was simply an-
other provider’s fault, bad luck with disease progression, or patient’s compliance.
Value-based healthcare delivery requires the providers to work in teams while each
provider is performing part of the interrelated treatment, hence, the health out-
comes of the patient depend on all providers’ quality of care and cooperation.
Ontario’s current proposed plan for the implementation of ICCP includes one
single contract for multiple services based on patients’ need, i.e. bundled payment
approach, where multiple providers are reimbursed by a single sum of money for
the related services to a defined episode of care. As a result, instead of paying
for discrete services, as in fee-for-service payment, the bundled payment encour-
ages the providers to improve the quality and eliminate clinically ineffective or
redundant services [60]. Even though it has been argued that a bundled payment
may improve quality and reduce the costs simultaneously, its implementation faces
challenges [60]. The primary concerns with the bundled payment are that it will
be impossible to manage when independent providers are expected to collaborate
and share the payment [60, 61]. One of the major problems is the determination
and the distribution of payment among the providers in an IPU [61]. A contrac-
tual and collaborative arrangement among the providers and facilities is needed
to determine how the payments should be distributed among the providers in an
IPU [61]. The implementation of these arrangements would require significant
structural changes within the participating entities. For example, hospitals would
need to reimburse physicians for their services. As a result, the responsible entity
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would have to set up contracting, billing, and reimbursement systems with other
providers in the team, which may translate to an expansion of current technological
capabilities as well [61].
We assume the healthcare purchaser offers a contract to the IPU, based on
their overall performance over the care cycle of the disease. Therefore, here we
will focus on the payment system among the healthcare providers within an IPU
which will encourage providers to collaborate and coordinate on the care.
To model this problem, we assume that one of the involved healthcare providers,
is the entity who is accountable for health outcomes to the healthcare purchaser
and receives the payments from her, whom we will call healthcare leader. The
healthcare leader is committing to a contract with the health purchaser and is
facing the risk of stochastic health outcomes, and hence needs to design a contract
which leads to optimal treatment decisions by the other healthcare providers. The
healthcare leader will play the principal role, but is also involved in providing the
treatment to patients. When the principal is also involved in performing tasks that
affect the outcomes, the problem of hidden action exacerbates to the problem of
double hidden action. In our problem, we will assume all parties are risk-neutral
and willing to consider providing different treatments that might result in better
health outcomes for the patients.
The value of the care depends heavily on how different related healthcare
providers interact and provide the service, therefore cooperation and coordina-
tion is a vital factor and needs to be enhanced. Care provision to the patient is
subject to patient risk factors, type of disease, and the extent to which the care
pathway is defined. Because both healthcare leader and healthcare provider are
involved in the treatment decisions, they are facing the problem of multi-sided
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hidden action. 1 Multisided hidden action arises when several agents take com-
plementary hidden actions [25, 37]. In an IPU, health provider’s and leader’s
actions stochastically influence the health outcomes in the current period and the
state of the system in the next period. We model this collaborative, iterative, and
stochastic work as a finite-horizon stochastic game [62, 63], in which the state of
the patient evolves according to a Markov Chain and the transition probabilities
depend on the quality of treatments.
The work dynamics among the team members are affected by the choice of
contract. Since the collective efforts of the providers will affect the patient’s health
outcome, it is impossible to infer the respective intensity or quality of care from
the health outcomes. The problem in the healthcare context is more cumbersome
since, health outcomes stochastically depends on the care provided and patient’s
risk factors and compliance to the care process. When efforts are unverifiable,
finding the optimal contract is challenging [37]. It is important to determine
which contracts should be adopted and how they affect the collaboration dynamics
among the providers.
We will consider two cases. First, we will assume the health outcome is con-
tractible. We study the work dynamics under reward-sharing contracts. When the
outcomes of treatments are either affected by other factors or emerge late in the
process, they are not contractible. Second, we will investigate the work dynamics
when the health outcomes are noncontracitble. In contract theory, informal agree-
ments have proved to be beneficial when the outcome of a partnership is stochastic
and non-contractible, as it might be the case in the healthcare providers’ relation-
ships in an IPU. We will derive the work dynamics under an informal agreement
which makes payments contingent on non-contractible health outcomes.
1In the literature, the term multisided moral hazard has been used to refer to the same
problem. However, in this chapter, we will use multisided hidden action.
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4.2 Literature Review
Classic agency theory has provided tools to examine the principal-agent problem.
The principal hires an agent to complete the tasks that are too complicated or
too costly to perform. The main concern is how the principal can motivate the
agent to perform the tasks as the principal would prefer [23]. Because of the noise
in the (production) process, the output is uncertain, and compensations based on
the output exposes the agent to an undesirable risk.
In the standard principal-agent model, the principal moves first and selects
the payment system to the agent which depends on the output. Next, the agent
selects an effort level, which the principal cannot observe. The agent’s effort
level will determine the output stochastically. This is a problem of single-sided
hidden action, where the principal’s action can be identified with a monetary
transfer rule. When two parties are in a partnership, as in our case, each of
them exerts an unobservable effort for an interrelated process. The output level is
stochastic and depends on the effort level of all players, resulting in a situation of
double hidden action [37]. When the objective is to optimize the global system,
the problem of hidden action can be alleviated through coordinating contracts.
Contract theory has been applied to business-to-business settings, including cross-
functional coordination [64] and supply chain coordination [65–68]. Nevertheless,
most of these contracts are developed specifically for manufacturer-supplier or
supplier-retailer paradigms to maximize profit through sales, assuming the output
quality will not be altered. In contrast to supply contracts, which are based on
quantities, the model for healthcare providers is focused on the quality of the
service and its outcomes. Furthermore, the health outcomes over the care cycle is
the true measure for the IPU’s success. Considering that the healthcare provider
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and leader will be engaged in the joint service, there needs to be substantial
modeling changes in comparison to the traditional principal-agent framework.
Linking the payoffs in one period to the outcomes in previous periods can
reduce the severity of hidden action problem and therefore improve risk sharing.
Malcomoson et al. [69] shows that efficient contracts under hidden action do not
require long-term commitments. The possibility of severe punishments makes
the short-term contracts as efficient as long-term contracts for both agent and
principal. Fudenberg et al. [46] also studies long-term principal-agent relationships
where the agent’s consumption is not necessarily based on his compensation, and
also his compensation is according to a verifiable outcome. They have shown that
short-term contracts are as good as long-term contracts. The main assumption in
their study is that the principal and the agent have the same information about
available technologies, the agent’s preferences over future outcomes, and the agent
has an unlimited access to saving and borrowing at the same interest rate as
the principal. Since, in general, healthcare providers have access to the capital
provided by a third party, the banking assumption is defensible in the healthcare
delivery context and has been used by Fuloria et al. to derive an outcome-adjusted
payment system as well [27].
Bonatti et al. examines the hidden action (moral hazard) problem in teams
over time where agents are collectively involved in a project whose duration and
outcome are uncertain, and their individual efforts are unverifiable [70]. Bonatti et
al. consider projects with two states, characterize the work dynamics with respect
to time, and find that collaboration diminishes over time, but the project will
continue until it succeeds. Rahmani et al. [71] characterizes the work dynamics
for knowledge-intensive projects for which the rewards increases as the project
proceeds. Similar to Rahmani et al., we will characterize the work dynamics with
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respect to time and state. However, our research concentrates on two payment
systems that (arguably) reduce the problem of hidden action, specifically reward-
sharing and relational contracts.
When the agent’s total contribution is not contractible, there are two alterna-
tives: court-enforceable contracts based on alternative performance measures and
relational contracts [72]. Relational contracts are the agreements which are based
on outcomes that are observed by contracting parties ex post. Relational contracts
allow the parties to use their knowledge of specific situation and also utilize new
information as it becomes available. Relational contracts are self-enforceable if
each party’s reputation is sufficiently valuable that neither party wishes to break
a promise, for a seminal study see [73].
The use of the combination of both formal and informal contracts is custom-
ary. Many companies use both piece rates and subjective bonuses [73, 74]. The
simultaneous use of formal contracts based on objective performance measures and
relational contracts based on discretionary bonuses based on total contribution has
been studied by Baker et al. [74]. The use of a relational contract can reduce the
distortionary incentives that a formal contract could create. The use of a formal
contract can also reduce the size of the bonus to be offered by the principal if she
would use the relational contract only. Thus a combination of formal and informal
contracts might be beneficial for both parties. For overview of contract theory see
[72].
Previous studies have concentrated on the static models for designing the op-
timal contracts for the collaborative relationships [75, 76]. The exception is the
study by Plambeck et al. [77], in which they formalize the optimal contract using
a dynamic principal-agent framework. Plambeck et al. consider two profit maxi-
mizing risk-neutral firms that engage in joint production in which outputs of the
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system, payments, and future of the relationship are determined by the actions
of both manufacturer and buyer. They demonstrate the existence of a simple
relational contract when buyer and manufacturer are interacting over multiple
periods.
In a static setting, Bhattacharyya et al. [78] show the second-best outcome can
be obtained by a reward-sharing contract and Roels et al. [76] analyze the pricing
and assignment of efforts in the presence of complementary effort levels. Roels
et al. characterize the optimal contract and its dependence to the service envi-
ronment characteristics, such as output elasticity, effort verification costs, output
uncertainty, output measurability, and process improvement opportunities. Their
model finds the optimal contract for two risk-neutral agents working together on
a project with identified output [76]. Roels and colleagues find that simple con-
tracts like fixed-fee and time-and-materials perform poorly in the context of static
double hidden action.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We will detail the part-
nership model in §4.3. We derive the dynamics of collaboration when efforts are
verifiable in §4.4, we call this the first-best solution. We study the effects of two
payment schemes that are established to alleviate the double hidden action prob-
lem, namely reward-sharing contracts and relational contracts in §4.5.1 and 4.5.2,
respectively. We present our conclusions in §4.6. All proofs appear in Appendix
§4.A.
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4.3 Partnership Modeling
In this section we present a model for dynamic healthcare delivery. We assume
two players are engaged in treating the patient over multiple periods, healthcare
provider and healthcare leader i = {p, `}, respectively. The healthcare leader has
the role of care manager, who also provides care to the patients [5]. We will model
the healthcare delivery by the IPU as a dynamic game over the finite disease
cycle T . As in chapter 3, we define the patient health status as being “well” or
“unwell,” and the success for the IPU as keeping the patient in the “well” status
or bringing them back to the “well” status. Accordingly, the IPU fails when the
patient remains in the “unwell” status or transitions back to the “unwell” health
status. Figure 4.1 summarizes the health dynamics for a patient.
At each stage, player i = {p, `} chooses his effort ai from a finite action space
Ai. In this chapter, we assume each provider can either “work” collaboratively
or “not work” collaboratively, ai ∈ {W,N}. As a result of this binary action,
(U,m + 1, n) (W,m, n) (W,m, n + 1)
(U,m + 1, n) (U,m, n) (W,m, n + 1)
pj
1− pj
pj
1− pj
Figure 4.1: Problem state: patient status “well” or “unwell” (W or U), number
of failures (m), and number of successes (n); probability of failure pj
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Table 4.1: Providers’ efforts and working relationship outcomes
Provider \ Leader Work W Not Work N
Work W High Lowp
Not Work N Low` Stop
four working modes are possible High, Lowp, Low`, Stop. The working modes rep-
resent the outcome of the actions taken by the providers. When both providers
work collaboratively, the outcome is “High” and will represent high quality treat-
ment. Table 4.1 summarizes these working modes. Each working mode induces a
probability distribution over the publicly observable outcome x.
As a result of the problem state dynamics explained in figure 4.1, the number
of IPU failures can summarize the problem state. For each period t ∈ T , the
state of the problem at the beginning of period t is denoted by xt. When the IPU
succeeds in healthcare delivery, the number of failures will not change. Therefore,
the problem state at the beginning of period t+1 will be xt+1 = xt. When the IPU
fails, the number of failures increases in the next period by one unit xt+1 = xt + 1.
As mentioned before, health outcomes are stochastic and depend on the working
mode. The probability of failure for each working mode is denoted by pj, where
j = {H,Lp, L`} representing High, Low`, Lowp. The state xt evolves to state xt+1
with probability pj or remains at state xt with probability 1 − pj as depicted in
figure 4.2.
0 1 2
pjpj
1− pj
pj
1− pj 1− pj
Figure 4.2: State dynamics in working mode j = {H,Lp, L`}
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We assume the probability of failure for modes Lowp and Low` is equal pL` = pLp
and will be noted by pL. The probability of failure when both providers work
collaboratively (High) is lower than individual efforts (Lowi), i.e. pH < pL. If
both providers choose not to work in collaboration (Stop), they will terminate the
treatments on the patient and the system will not evolve afterwards.
There are monetary and non-monetary costs associated with each working
mode. Each player will incur costs according to their effort level and the resulting
working mode. We denote the cost of working mode High by cH > 0 and the cost
of working mode lowiLi or low
i
L−i for player i, by c
i
Li and c
i
L−i , respectively. We
assume that working in collaboration with the other player requires more time
and effort, the cost of working in High mode for any player i, ciH is greater than
working in LowiLi or low
i
L−i , i.e. c
`
H > max{c`Lp , c`L`} and cpH > max{cpLp , cpL`}. In
addition, we assume the player that is not collaborating will incur a lower cost
than the one who is working individually cp
L`
< c`
L`
and c`Lp < c
p
Lp . Since the
healthcare leader is both providing service and overseeing the care process for the
patient, c`
L`
≥ cpLp . We will assume that when the healthcare provider and leader
decide to Stop and terminate the treatments earlier than the end of the disease
cycle t < T , they will incur the penalty of kp and k`, respectively.
We assume perfect information about the patient and other player’s costs.
When efforts are contractible, the providers write a contract to maximize the
total surplus. We refer to this situation as first-best solution. When efforts are
not contractible, we will consider two situations. First, we will study the case
where health outcomes are contractible and study the effect of payment schemes
like performance-based and capitation. Next, we will consider the case where
health outcomes are noncontractible and we will investigate the effects of using a
relational contract among the providers.
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4.4 The First-Best Solution
If the provider’s and leader’s efforts were verifiable, the first-best solution could
be attained by writing a contract based on the rewards and costs. We will solve
a finite-horizon dynamic programming problem to derive the optimal policy. We
denote the first-best optimal policy in state x and time t by εfbt (x). Recall, x is
the cumulative number of failures that the IPU has faced up until period t.
Denote by Vt(x) the total discounted surplus in period t and state x, defined
recursively as follows:
Vt(x) = max{Vt(x|High), Vt(x|Lowp), Vt(x|Low`), Vt(x|Stop)} t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
VT (x) = R(x)
(4.1)
The value function at the end of disease cycle T depends on the number of fail-
ures during the care cycle. As the number of failures x increases, the reward
R(x) decreases. We assume the healthcare purchaser encourages providing quality
care from the outset and preventing avoidable complications instead of curing the
complications later in the disease cycle. As a result, the reward function R(x) is
decreasing convex.
With the assumption c`
L`
≥ cpLp , Lowp weekly dominates Low`. As a re-
sult, Low` is never optimal. In the first-best solution, we refer to Lowp as Low.
Hence only three working modes are attainable in period t and state x, εfbt (x) =
{High, Low, Stop}. Time is discounted at a rate δ ≤ 1.
Vt(x|High) = −cpH − c`H + δ [pHVt+1(x+ 1) + (1− pH)Vt+1(x)]
Vt(x|Low) = −cpL − c`L + δ [pLVt+1(x+ 1) + (1− pL)Vt+1(x)]
Vt(x|Stop) = −K
(4.2)
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t
x
Low
High
Figure 4.3: Dynamics of collaboration among the providers in an IPU; the
first-best Solution
Throughout this chapter, we denote ∆Vt(x) = Vt(x+ 1)− Vt(x) and ∆R(x) =
R(x+ 1)−R(x). Recall, reward function is decreasing with x thus, ∆R(x) ≤ 0.
We characterize the dynamics of the first-best solution in proposition 4.1. We
show that there is a time-independent number of failures threshold above which
it is optimal to work in Low mode. Comparing Vt(x|High) and Vt(x|Low) yields
to the following optimal policy for any period t:
εfbt (x) = High if ∆Vt+1 ≤ (c
p
H+c
`
H)−(cpLp+c`Lp )
δ(pH−pL)
εfbt (x) = Low if ∆Vt+1 ≥ (c
p
H+c
`
H)−(cpLp+c`Lp )
δ(pH−pL)
(4.3)
The dynamics are illustrated in figure 4.3. The horizontal axis denotes the time
from the start of treatment t = 0 to the end of care cycle t = T and the vertical
axis shows the number of failures xt. Because the number of failures increases at
most by one unit in each period, the set of feasible states are below the 45-degree
line, xt ≤ t. The proof consists of decomposing the space (t, xt) into regions in
which the value function has decreasing differences in (t, xt) and then applying a
standard induction argument.
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We denote, for any t, the highest state where εfbt (x) = High, as
xfbH,t =
{
max{x ∈ Z+|Vt+1(x+ 1)− Vt+1(x) ≤ θfbLH}
}
(4.4)
where θfbLH =
(cpH+c
`
H)−(cpLp+c`Lp )
δ(pH−pL) . For any x < x
fb
H , we will define τ(x) := max{t ∈
T |∆Vt+1(x) ≤ θfbLH}, if there exists such a t that ∆Vt+1(x) ≤ θfbLH ; otherwise,
τ(x) = x− 1.
Proposition 4.1. There exists a threshold for number of failures xfbH
i. εfbt (x) = Low for all t if x ≥ xfbH
ii. for 1 ≤ x ≤ xfbH , there exists a time threshold τ(x), nondecreasing in x,
such that εfbt (x) = High for all τ(x) < t < T and ε
fb
t (x) = Low for all
x ≤ t ≤ τ(x)
Proposition 4.1 identifies the phases in which the IPU members should work
collaboratively. Working in High mode is optimal early in the disease cycle, and
Low is optimal as failures increases. When failures increase the providers tend to
work in Low mode longer.
4.5 Double-Sided Hidden Action
In the standard hidden action problem, the common assumption is that the prin-
cipal is passive in the relationship and is not involved in the job being undertaken
by the agent. The principal delegates all the decisions to the agent and designs
an incentive contract based on observable outputs that are correlated with agent’s
hidden action. However, in many situations, the principal also make choices that
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affects the outcomes. This is known as double-sided hidden action. In any IPU,
the healthcare providers work in teams as well and the collective efforts of all
providers over the care cycle determine the health outcomes of the patient. Re-
call, we consider the care manager as the principal in the relationship among the
IPU members.
We will consider two scenarios. First, we will study the collaboration dynam-
ics when the reward is contractible. We use the combination of reward-sharing
contract with capitation. Next, we consider the case where the reward is not con-
tractible. We use the combination of formal and informal contract to determine
the IPU’s collaboration dynamics.
4.5.1 Contractible Reward
Assuming the reward R(x) is contractible, in this section we consider a reward-
sharing contract among the providers. In static games, it has been shown that
an optimal second-best contract can be implemented through a linear revenue- or
profit-sharing contract [78]. We adopt a linear reward-sharing contract to study
the collaboration dynamics among IPU members. Each player i will receive a share
of αi from the reward R(x) that is, sp(x) = α
pR(x) and s`(x) = R(x) − sp(x) =
α`R(x) with αp + α` = 1. In addition to the payment at the end of disease
cycle sp(x), the healthcare provider will be paid an upfront fixed amount for each
patient. In return to this fixed amount, the provider will provide all the care
needed during the care cylce T . We will denote the upfront fixed payment at time
t = 0 by F .
We model the collaboration process as a finite-horizon dynamic stochastic game
[62]. We will denote the discounted equilibrium payoff-to-go of player i, i ∈ {p, `}
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in state x in period t by V it (x). The healthcare provider’s payoff given possible
collaboration outcomes is as follows:
V pt (x|j) = −cpj + δEj
[
V pt+1(x+ ξ)
]
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
V pt (x|Stop) = −kp, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
V pT (x) = α
pR(x)
(4.5)
where j = {High, Lowp, Low`} and Ej
[
V pt+1(x+ ξ)
]
= pjV
p
t+1(x + 1) + (1 −
pj)V
p
t+1(x). The healthcare leader’s payoff V
`
t (x) in state x and time period t is
V `t (x|j) = −c`j + δEj
[
V `t+1(x+ ξ)
]
, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
V `t (x|Stop) = −k`, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
V `T (x) = α
`R(x)
(4.6)
in which, Ej
[
V `t+1(x+ ξ)
]
= pjV
`
t+1(x+ 1) + (1− pj)V `t+1(x).
δEj
[
V pt+1(x+ ξ)
] ≥ 0 (4.7)
δEj
[
V `t+1(x+ ξ)
] ≥ 0 (4.8)
constraints (4.7) and (4.8) ensure that both players prefer to continue the collab-
oration rather than stopping the treatments.
For this game, we will consider a feedback information structure [79], which
means that during each period the players know exactly to which state the game
has evolved and that information is fed back to their strategies and actions. We
will focus on pure-strategy Markov-perfect equilibria [80]. Markov equilibria is the
simplest form of behavior consistent with rationality and can capture the notion
that “bygones are bygones” [80]. Similar to Marx and Matthews [81] and Rah-
mani [71], we will characterize the collaboration dynamics when a pure-strategy
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equilibrium exists.
To be able to compare the working modes, we will define some thresholds
which will allow us to compare the working modes to each other. Since the cost
of working in Low−i mode is lower than working in Lowi mode for player i, and
the probability of failures are the same pLi = pL−i = pL, working mode Low
−i
dominates Lowi for player i. Therefore, we only need to compare High and Low−i
for each player.
V it (x|High) = −ciH + δEH [V it+1(x+ ξ)]
V it (x|Low−i) = −ciL−i + δEL[V it+1(x+ ξ)]
where Ej[V it+1(x + ξ)] = pjV it+1(x + 1) + (1 − pj)V it+1(x). We will define εRSt (x)
as the selected pure-strategy equilibrium played in period t and state x under
reward-sharing contract.
We will start from period T − 1 and define the following threshold for player
i ∈ {p, `}:
θRSLiH =
ciH − ciL−i
δαi(pH − pL) (4.9)
In period T − 1, player i prefers Low−i over High if and only if ∆R(x) ≥ θRSLiH . We
define xRSL and x
RS
H as follows:
xRSL = max{x ∈ Z+|∆R(x) ≥ max{θRSLpH , θRSL`H}}. (4.10)
xRSH = max{x ∈ Z+|∆R(x) ≤ min{θRSLpH , θRSL`H}} (4.11)
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By comparing working modes Stop and High and working modes Stop and
Lowi the following thresholds can been derived for i ∈ {p, `}:
θRSSLi =
ciLi − ki
δαipL
− R(x)
δpL
θRSSH =
ciH − ki
δαipH
− R(x)
δpH
At each time period t, the highest state for which collaboration is optimal is
defined as x¯RSH,t, in which
x¯RSH,t ≡ max{x ≤ x¯RSH,t+1|εRSt (x) = High}.
For any x < xRSH , we will define τ
RS
H := min{t ∈ T |εRSt (x) = High}, if there
exists such a t that for both players ∆V it+1(x) ≤ αiθRSLiH ; otherwise, τRSH (x) = T .
For any x < xRSH , we will define τ
RS
L (x) := max{t ∈ T |εRSt (x) = Low`}, i.e.
∆V pt+1(x) ≥ αpθRSLpH if there exists such a t ; otherwise, τRSL (x) = x− 1.
For the Stop to dominate High or Lowi in period T −1 the following conditions
should hold, respectively
∆R(x) ≤ θRSSLi
∆R(x) ≤ θRSSH
Since R(x + 1)− R(x) > −R(x) or ∆R(x) > −R(x), ∆R(x) will be greater than
a smaller value as well, i.e. ∆R(x) > −R(x)
δpj
.Assuming ki > cij, then ∆R(x) will
never be smaller than θRSSLi and θ
RS
SH and therefore the cost stopping the treatments
is much greater than the cost of the treatments. As a result, working mode Stop
is dominated by High and Lowi in all the periods.
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Figure 4.4: Dynamics of collaboration among providers in an IPU in a reward-
sharing contract
We find that the collaboration dynamics under the reward-sharing contract
are similar to the first-best solution. However, the players tend to start working
individually at lower number of failures in comparison to the first-best solution.
Proposition 4.2 characterizes the reward-sharing collaboration dynamics and figure
4.4 demonstrates that result.
Proposition 4.2. There exists thresholds for the number of IPU failures xRSH and
xRSL such that
i. for all x ≥ xRSL , εRSt (x) = Low`.
ii. for all xRSH < x < x
RS
L ,
a. if αp(c`H − c`Lp) < α`(cpH − cpL`), εRST−1(x) = Low`.
b. if αp(c`H − c`Lp) ≥ α`(cpH − cpL`), εRST−1(x) = Lowp.
iii. for all x ≤ xRSH , there exists a time threshold τRSH (x) nondecreasing with x,
such that εRSt (x) = High for all τ
RS
H (x) < t < T ,
a. if αp(c`H − c`Lp) < α`(cpH − cpL`), εRSt (x) = Low` for all x ≤ t ≤ τRSH (x).
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b. if αp(c`H − c`Lp) ≥ α`(cpH − cpL`), there exists a time threshold τRSL (x) <
τRSH (x), such that ε
RS
t (x) = Low
p for all τRSL (x) ≤ t ≤ τRSH (x) and εRSt (x) =
Low` for all x ≤ t ≤ τRSL (x).
Note that using the capitation payment alone cannot motivate the provider
to work collaboratively with the leader. The reason for this is the fact that the
provider might find providing less than efficient quality of care more beneficial.
When the payments to the provider are connected to the overall performance of
the IPU at the end of disease cycle, then the leader and provider will make decisions
informatively based on the expected benefits of treatments for the patient and the
expected costs of exerting higher efforts.
In this study, we combined the capitation payment with reward-sharing con-
tracts. We find that such a payment system can invoke collaboration among the
players. The results show that they create similar results to the first-best solu-
tion. Nevertheless, the providers start working in Low mode with smaller number
of failures, xRSH < x
fb
H in the reward-sharing contract. One of the difficulties in
the implementation of such a contract is when multiple equilibria exist, i.e. when
both Lowp and Low` is optimal. In deriving the results, we assumed the healthcare
leader will determine the working mode when there are multiple equilibria. But,
in practice this situation might result in conflicts and implementation challenges.
4.5.2 Noncontractible Reward
When it is difficult to assess and contract on the value of health outcomes, rewards
are not contractible. Furthermore, the stochasticity of health outcomes could be
exacerbated by patient’s noncompliance to the treatment regimen. In this case,
any of the players could assert that the failure of healthcare delivery is due to
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other factors. In this part, we will investigate the effects of an alternative payment
system that can incorporate the noncontractability of health outcomes. When the
outcomes are not contractible, relational contracts have proved to alleviate the
problem of hidden action [73, 77].
We study the effects of using a relational contract which is a combination of
formal and informal contracts. Relational contracts were first introduced by Levin
[73], where he found the optimal contract can take a form of simple stationary
contract. Levin found that with the hidden action problem the self-enforced opti-
mal contract is comprised of two levels of compensation. The principal sets a base
payment independent of the agent’s performance. The voluntary payment to the
agent is “one-step:” a bonus if output exceeds a threshold. In another study Plam-
beck et al. [77] studied the relational contract in the context of infinitely repeated
relationships in joint production. Plambeck and colleagues found that the ongoing
relationship facilitates the self-enforcement of relational contracts. The optimal
contract has a simple form and does not depend on the past history. Using the
results of Plambeck et al. study, we will study the collaboration dynamics between
the providers using a memoryless contract, where the agreed upon action depends
on the current state and payments depend only on the observed transition. To
discourage free riding, the optimal contract imposes termination to jointly punish
the providers following undesirable outcomes.
The relational contract is comprised of a formal (court-enforced) contract and
a discretionary payment. With the formal contract the healthcare leader pays a
constant amount f at the beginning of each period to the healthcare provider,
even if the health outcomes are suffering. The discretionary payment dt depends
on the performance at the end of period t. The discretionary payment may depend
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on the public history at the end of period t and transition to the state xt+1. We
will assume the provider will receive a constant payment f ≥ cpH in each period.
The IPU’s objective is to minimize the number of failures x. Hence, we will
assume the discretionary payment to the provider dt(x) is decreasing with x,
dt(x) > dt(x+ 1) and increasing with t, dt(x) < dt+1(x).
The healthcare provider will choose his effort level to maximize
V pt (x|j) = −cpj + f + Ej
[
dt(x+ ξ) + δV
p
t+1(x+ ξ)
]
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
V pt (x|Stop) = −kp, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
V pT (x) = 0
(4.12)
The healthcare leader is responsible to pay f and dt to the healthcare provider,
whereas the rewards for the IPU’s performance R(x) will be collected by the
healthcare leader at the end of disease cycle T .
V `t (x|j) = −c`j − f + Ej
[−dt(x+ ξ) + δV `t+1(x+ ξ)] , for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
V `t (x|Stop) = −k`, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
V `T (x) = R(x),
(4.13)
where
Ej
[
dt(x+ ξ) + δV
p
t+1(x+ ξ)
]
= pj
[
δV pt+1(x+ 1) + dt(x+ 1)
]
+ (1− pj)
[
δV pt+1(x) + dt(x)
]
and
Ej
[−dt(x+ ξ) + δV `t+1(x+ ξ)] = pj [δV `t+1(x+ 1)− dt(x+ 1)]
+ (1− pj)
[
δV `t+1(x)− dt(x)
]
.
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Ej
[
dt(x+ ξ) + δV
p
t+1(x+ ξ)
] ≥ 0 (4.14)
Ej
[−dt(x+ ξ) + δV `t+1(x+ ξ)] ≥ 0 (4.15)
constraints (4.14) and (4.15) capture the expected payoff for the healthcare leader
and provider from continuing the partnership. Since Stop is the most credible
punishment that can be imposed on a player that fails to execute the relational
contract, constraints (4.14) and (4.15) are necessary conditions for the relational
contract to be self-enforcing. If a contract is self-enforcing, then no party has
incentive to deviate unilaterally.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium collaboration dynamics un-
der relational contracts. Figure 4.5 illustrates the results.
We will first define the following threshold for the healthcare provider:
θ
(R)p
LH =
cpH − cpL`
pH − pL
In period T−1, the provider prefers Low` over High if and only if ∆dT−1(x) ≥ θ(R)
p
LH .
Because, we assume dt(x) is decreasing with x, ∆dt(x) < 0. Further, we assume
dt(x) is convex, hence ∆dt(x) has increasing differences with x. As a result, there
is a threshold x
(R)p
H as defined below, where the provider would prefer working
mode High for all x ≤ x(R)pH in period T − 1.
x
(R)p
H = max{x ∈ Z+|∆dT (x) ≤ θ(R)
p
LH } (4.16)
At any t < T − 1 the healthcare provider will choose Low` over High if and only if
δ∆V pt+1(x) + ∆dt(x) ≥ θ(R)
p
LH . (4.17)
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By comparing the value function for the healthcare leader, We will define θ
(R)`
LH
as healthcare leader’s threshold.
θ
(R)`
LH =
c`H − c`Lp
pH − pL
The healthcare leader will prefer Lowp over High at period T − 1, if and only if
δ∆R(x) ≥ θ(R)`LH .
At any t < T − 1 the healthcare provider will choose Lowp over High if and only if
δ∆V `t+1(x)−∆dt(x) ≥ θ(R)
`
LH (4.18)
We define
x
(R)`
H = max{x ∈ Z+|δ∆R(x) ≤ θ(R)
`
LH } (4.19)
for all x ≤ x(R)`H , indictaing that the healthcare leader prefers working mode High
over Lowp at period T − 1.
Finally, we will define xRH and x
R
L as follows
xRH = min{x(R)
p
H , x
(R)`
H }
and
xRL = max{x(R)
p
H , x
(R)`
H }
For each state x < xRL , let us define
τ¯(x) := {t ∈ T |δ∆V pt+1(x) + ∆dt(x) ≥ θ(R)
p
LH }
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t
x
Low
High
Figure 4.5: Dynamics of collaboration among providers in an IPU in a rela-
tional contract
τ
¯
(x) := {t ∈ T |δ∆V `t+1(x)−∆dt(x) ≥ θ(R)
`
LH }
if there exists such a t, otherwise τ
¯
(x) = x and τ¯(x) = T .
Proposition 4.3. There exist thresholds for the number of failures xRH and x
R
L
i. εRt (x) = Low for all t and x > x
R
L .
ii. for all x < xRL there exists time thresholds τ¯
(x) and τ¯(x) such that εRt (x) =
Lowp for x ≤ t < τ
¯
(x), εRt (x) = High for τ¯
(x) ≤ t ≤ τ¯(x), and εRt = Low`
for τ¯(x) < t < T .
The results from the relational contract suggest that the healthcare provider
would prefer to work collaboratively sooner so that he can collect the rewards
from keeping the patient healthy. However, the healthcare leader will increase
his efforts as time passes and when the patient is in good health. The optimal
policy for the IPU is to work in High mode earlier in the disease cycle. Comparing
the results of relational contracts with the first-best solution indicates that the
IPU members start working in Low mode sooner, xRH ≤ xfbH . Comparison of the
relational contract with reward-sharing contract suggests that there exists time
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periods for which a relational contract could result in more collaborative work
than the reward-sharing contract. Particularly, the results from the reward-sharing
contract is similar to the first-best solution, but the collaboration might emerge
later in the care process. With the relational contracts, discretionary payments
at the end of each period can encourage the provider to work more earlier in the
process while the reward-sharing contract stimulates collaboration at the same
time for both the provider and the leader.
4.6 Conclusions
We studied how different contractual arrangements affect the collaboration dy-
namics among the IPU members in treating a patient over a finite time horizon.
We identify that providers would prefer to work in Low mode when the number
of failures have exceeded a threshold. We find that the IPU members prefer to
work in High mode when the patient is showing good results to the high qual-
ity treatments. In this case, they want to keep the failures to a minimum and
therefore, would provide high quality treatments. However, when the number of
failures increases, the IPU members would prefer low quality treatments sooner.
When facing the double-sided hidden action problem, if the efforts are not
contractible, the collaboration dynamics depend on the type of contract. We
considered two types of hybrid contracts. First, we studied capitation with a
reward-sharing contract. Second, we used the combination of formal and informal
contracts to study how relational contracts can affect the collaboration dynamics.
The reward-sharing contract resulted in similar dynamics to the first-best solution,
but with less collaboration overall. Reward sharing contract performed very well,
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nonetheless its implementation and applicability depends on the contractability of
rewards.
We used relational contracts to evaluate the collaboration dynamics when the
rewards are not be contractible. This type of contracts have a formal, court-
enforced, component. In the IPU, the provider will be paid a fixed-amount no mat-
ter what the health outcomes are. Relational contracts also have a discretionary
payment component. We considered a general form of discretionary payment,
which is decreasing with the number of failures. We found that the provider is
encouraged to work in collaboration sooner than the leader. The provider’s incen-
tive stems from the discretionary payment at the end of each period. Nonetheless,
the healthcare leader and IPU’s performance will be assessed at the end of disease
cycle. The convolution of these preferences can result in more collaboration than
the reward-sharing contract.
This work can be extended in several ways. First, the assumptions of the
model can be generalized by considering continuous time models, constant rewards
for sustaining patients’ health, or stopping the collaboration without any costs.
Second, the effect of learning among the providers could be studied by considering
decreasing costs throughout time. Our model could be generalized to study the
effect of having multiple providers within an IPU. More fundamentally, the IPU
members might not behave rationally. Increasing or decreasing non-monetary costs
of collaboration could also alter the collaboration dynamics.
The IPU members have to answer questions regarding the team management
and resource allocation. It is valuable to study how the existence of a healthcare
leader affects the dynamics. Specifically, what would happen to the dynamics
of collaboration if the IPU members work without a leader? Would having no
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leader affect how much resources the providers allocate to specific treatments?
Investigating these questions can result in meaningful insights.
4.A Appendix: Chapter 4 Proofs
4.A.1 The First-Best Solution
We define the following threshold:
θfbLH =
(cpH + c
`
H)− (cpLp + c`Lp)
δ(pH − pL) (4.20)
Threshold θfbLH along with equations (4.3) allow us to compare working modes
High and Low. Working mode Low is preferred over working mode High in period
T − 1 if and only if R(x+ 1)−R(x) ≥ θfbLH .
We define xfbH
xfbH = min{x ∈ Z+|∆R(x) ≥ θfbLH} (4.21)
We denote, for any t, the highest state where εfbt (x) = High, as
xfbH,t =
{
max{x ∈ Z+|Vt+1(x+ 1)− Vt+1(x) ≤ θfbLH}
}
. (4.22)
For any x < xfbH , we will define τ(x) := max{t ∈ T |∆Vt+1(x) ≤ θfbLH}, if there
exists such a t that ∆Vt+1(x) ≤ θfbLH ; otherwise, τ(x) = x− 1.
Throughout the proofs we will use the notation Ej[Vt(x+ ξ)]
Ej[Vt(x+ ξ)] = pjVt(x+ 1) + (1− pj)Vt(x)
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Lemma 4.1. For any x, Vt(x) is nondecreasing in t.
Proof. We proof this lemma by induction on t. When t = T − 1, VT (x) = R(x) ≥
VT−1(x). To see this, note that R(x) is decreasing with x, R(x+1) ≤ R(x). Hence,
δ[pjR(x + 1) + (1− pj)R(x)] ≤ δR(x) ≤ R(x). Since VT−1(x) = −cj + δ[pjR(x +
1) + (1− pj)R(x)], VT (x) ≥ VT−1(x).
Fix t < T − 1 and suppose that Vt+1(x) ≥ Vt(x), ∀x . Then,
Vt(x) = max {−K,−cH + δEH [Vt+1(x+ ξ),−cH + δEL[Vt+1(x+ ξ)]}
≥ max {−K,−cH + δEH [Vt(x+ ξ),−cH + δEL[Vt(x+ ξ)]} = Vt−1(x)
Lemma 4.2. εfbt (x) = Low for all t if and only if x ≥ xfbH .
Proof. This proof uses lemma (4.1). Using equations (4.2), we obtain εfbt (x) =
Low ⇔ ∆R(x) ≥ θfbLH . Since R(x) is decreasing and ∆R(x) ≤ 0 for all x, ∆R(x)
is increasing with x. Further, θfbLH < 0 and does not vary with x, ε
fb
T−1(x) = Low
if x ≥ xfbH .
Next, we show by induction on t that if εfbT−1(x) = Low, then ε
fb
t (x + k) =
Low ∀k ≥ 0 and t ≤ T − 1. When t = T − 1, εfbT−1(x+ k) = Low ∀k ≥ 0. For any
t < T − 1, suppose that εfbt+1(x+ k) = Low ∀k ≥ 0, therefore ∆Vt+2(x+ k) ≥ θfbLH .
Applying the condition ∆Vt+1(x+k) = Vt+1(x+k+1)−Vt+1(x+k), ∆Vt+1(x+k) =
−cL + δEL[Vt+2(x+k+ 1 + ξ) + cL− δEL[Vt+2(x+k+ ξ)] = δpL∆Vt+2(x+k+ 1) +
δ(1−pL)∆Vt+2(x+k). As a result ∆Vt+1(x+k) ≥ δpLθfbLH +δ(1−pL)θfbLH ≥ δθfbLH .
Since θfbLH < 0 for all x, δθ
fb
LH ≥ θfbLH . Thus, ∆Vt+1(x+k) ≥ θfbLH , i.e.εfbt (x) = Low,
completing the induction step.
Lemma 4.3. If εfbt+1(x+ 1) = ε
fb
t+1(x) = Low, then ε
fb
t (x) = Low.
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Proof. Because If εfbt+1(x+1) = ε
fb
t+1(x) = Low, ∆Vt+2(x+1) ≥ θfbLH and ∆Vt+2(x) ≥
θfbLH . Moreover, since ∆Vt+1(x) = Vt+1(x + 1) − Vt+1(x), ∆Vt+1(x) = −cL +
δEL[Vt+2(x+1+ξ)+cL−δEL[Vt+2(x+ξ)] = δpL∆Vt+2(x+1)+δ(1−pL)∆Vt+2(x).
Replacing ∆Vt+2(x + 1) ≥ θfbLH and ∆Vt+2(x) ≥ θfbLH , results in ∆Vt+1(x) ≥
δpLθ
fb
LH + δ(1 − pL)θfbLH ≥ δθfbLH . Since θfbLH < 0 for all x, δθfbLH ≥ θfbLH . Thus,
∆Vt+1(x+ k) ≥ θfbLH , i.e. εfbt (x) = Low, completing the induction step.
Lemma 4.4. For any t, xfbH,t defined in (4.22), is nondecreasing in t, i.e. x
fb
H,t ≤
xfbH,t+1.
Proof. By definition, εfbt (x) 6= High for all x > xfbH,t, or εfbt (x) = Low for all
x > xfbH,t. Suppose by contradiction that x
fb
H,t > x
fb
H,t+1 for some t. Then, there
must exist some x, xfbH,t ≥ x > xfbH,t+1, such that εfbt (x) = High and εfbt+1(x) = Low.
If εfbt+1(x + 1) = Low by lemma 4.3, we should then have had ε
fb
t (x) = Low, a
contradiction.
Lemma 4.5. For all t and all x, Vt(x) has decreasing differences in (x, t), i.e.
∆Vt(x) ≥ ∆Vt+1(x).
Proof. The proof uses lemmas 4.1 and 4.2. Consider period T −1 first. Since R(x)
is decreasing and convex, ∆R(x+ 1) ≥ ∆R(x) we have
∆VT−1(x) = −cj + δEj[R(x+ 1 + ξ)] + cj − δEj[R(x+ ξ)]
= δpj∆R(x+ 1) + δ(1− pj)∆R(x)
≥ δpj∆R(x) + δ(1− pj)∆R(x) ≥ ∆VT (x)
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Next for any t < T − 1, suppose ∆Vt+1(x) ≥ ∆Vt+2(x).
∆Vt(x) = −cj + δEj[Vt+1(x+ 1 + ξ)] + cj − δEj[Vt+1(x+ ξ)]
= δpj∆Vt+1(x+ 1) + δ(1− pj)∆Vt+1(x)
≥ δpj∆Vt+2(x+ 1) + δ(1− pj)∆Vt+2(x) ≥ ∆Vt+1(x)
in which the inequality follows by induction hypothesis. This completes the in-
duction step.
Lemma 4.6. For all x < xfbL , there exists a time threshold τ(x), nondecreasing in
x, such that εfbt = High for all τ(x) < t < T and ε
fb
t = Low for all x ≤ t ≤ τ(x).
Proof. Using lemma 4.5, ∆Vt(x) ≥ ∆Vt+1(x) for each x. By equations (4.3), if
∆Vt(x) ≤ θfbLH the optimal working mode εfbt = High. The decreasing differences
for Vt(x) assures there exists a time threshold τ(x) for which ∆Vt(x) = θ
fb
LH . Hence
by lemma 4.5, ∆Vt(x) ≤ θfbLH will hold for τ(x) < t < T , i.e. εfbt = High for all
τ(x) < t < T .
Proof of Proposition 4.1. This proof uses lemmas 1-6 in this appendix.
i. This is shown in lemma 4.2.
ii. This is shown in lemma 4.4.
iii. This is shown in lemma 4.6.
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4.A.2 Contractible Reward
Lemma 4.7. For any x, V it (x) and V
−i
t (x) are nondecreasing in t, which is
V it (x) ≤ V it+1(x) and V −it (x) ≤ V −it+1(x).
Proof. We proof this lemma by induction on t. When t = T−1, V iT (x) = αiR(x) ≥
V iT−1(x). To see this, note that R(x) is decreasing with x, R(x+1) ≤ R(x). Hence,
V iT−1(x) = −cij + δαi[pjR(x + 1) + (1 − pj)R(x)] ≤ δαiR(x) ≤ αiR(x) = V iT (x),
V iT−1(x) ≤ V iT (x).
Fix t < T − 1 and suppose that V it+1(x) ≥ V it (x), ∀x . Then,
V it (x) = −cij + δEH [V it+1(x+ ξ)]
≥ −cij + δEH [V it (x+ ξ) = V it−1(x),
completing the induction step. Similar deduction and proofs hold for V −it (x).
Lemma 4.8. εRSt (x) = Low for all t if and only if x ≥ xRSL .
Proof. This proof uses lemma (4.7). Using equations (4.5), (4.6), and (4.5.1), we
obtain εRSt (x) = Low
i ⇔ ∆R(x) ≥ θRSLiH . Since R(x) is decreasing and ∆R(x) ≤ 0
for all x, ∆R(x) is increasing with x. Further, θRSLiH < 0 and does not vary with x,
εRST−1(x) = Low
i if x ≥ xRSL .
Next, we show by induction on t that if εRST−1(x) = Low
i, then εRSt (x + k) =
Lowi ∀k ≥ 0 and t ≤ T − 1. When t = T − 1, εRST−1(x+ k) = Low ∀k ≥ 0. For any
t < T −1, suppose that εRSt+1(x+k) = Low ∀k ≥ 0, therefore ∆V it+2(x+k) ≥ θRSLiH .
Applying the condition ∆V it+1(x+k) = V
i
t+1(x+k+1)−V it+1(x+k), ∆V it+1(x+k) =
−ciL+δEL[V it+2(x+k+1+ξ)+ciL−δEL[V it+2(x+k+ξ)] = δpL∆V it+2(x+k+1)+δ(1−
pL)∆V
i
t+2(x+k). As a result ∆V
i
t+1(x+k) ≥ δpLθRSLiH+δ(1−pL)θRSLiH ≥ δθRSLiH . Since
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θRSLiH < 0 for all x, δθ
RS
LH ≥ θfbLH . Thus, ∆V it+1(x + k) ≥ θRSLiH , i.e.εRSt (x) = Lowi,
completing the induction step.
Lemma 4.9. If εRSt+1(x+ 1) = Low
i and εRSt+1(x) = Low
ior, εRSt (x) = Low
i.
Proof. If εRSt+1(x + 1) = ε
RS
t+1(x) = Low
i, ∆V it+2(x + 1) ≥ αiθRSLiH and ∆V it+2(x) ≥
αiθRSLiH . Since ∆V
i
t+1(x) = V
i
t+1(x + 1)− V it+1(x), ∆V it+1(x) = −cij + δEL[V it+2(x +
1+ξ)+cij−δEL[V it+2(x+ξ)] = δpL∆V it+2(x+1)+δ(1−pL)δV it+2(x) ≥ αiδpLθRSLiH +
αiδ(1 − pL)θRSLiH ≥ αiθRSLiH . Therefore, ∆V it+1(x) ≥ αiθRSLiH , i.e. εRSt (x) = Lowi,
completing the induction step.
We denote, for any t, the highest state where εRSt (x) = High, as
xRSH,t = max
{
x ≤ xRSH,t+1|V it+1(x+ 1)− V it+1(x) ≤ αiθRSLiH
}
(4.23)
Lemma 4.10. For any t, xRSH,t is nondecreasing in t, i.e. x
RS
H,t ≤ xRSH,t+1.
Proof. By definition, εRSt (x) 6= High for all x > xRSH,t, or εRSt (x) = Lowp or
εRSt (x) = Low
` for all x > xRSH,t. Suppose by contradiction that x
RS
H,t > x
RS
H,t+1 for
some t. Then, there must exist some x, xRSH,t ≥ x > xRSH,t+1, such that εRSt (x) =
High and εRSt+1(x) = Low. If ε
RS
t+1(x+ 1) = Low and ε
RS
t+1(x) = Low by lemma 4.9,
we should then have had εRSt (x) = Low, a contradiction.
We denote, for any t, the lowest state where εRSt (x) = Low
`, as
xRSL,t = min
{
x ≤ xRSL,t+1|V pt+1(x+ 1)− V pt+1(x) ≤ αpθRSLpH
}
(4.24)
Lemma 4.11. For any t, xRSL,t is nondecreasing in t, i.e. x
RS
L,t ≤ xRSL,t+1.
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Proof. By definition, εRSt (x) 6= High for all x > xRSH,t, or εRSt (x) = Lowp or
εRSt (x) = Low
` for all x > xRSH,t. If x
RS
L,t = x
RS
H,t, by lemma 4.10 the proof is
complete.
Next, suppose, xRSL,t 6= xRSH,t, i.e. min{θRSLpH , θRSL`H} = θRSL`H . by contradiction that
xfbL,t > x
fb
L,t+1 for some t. Then, there must exist some x, x
RS
L,t ≥ x > xRSL,t+1, such
that εRSt (x) = Low
` and εRSt+1(x) 6= Low`. If εRSt+1(x+1) = Lowp and εRSt+1(x) = Lowp
by lemma 4.9, we should then have had εRSt (x) = Low
p, a contradiction.
Lemma 4.12. ∆V it (x) has nonincreasing differences in (x, t), i.e. ∆V
i
t (x) ≥
∆V it+1.
Proof. The proof uses lemma 4.7. Consider period T − 1 first. Since R(x) is
decreasing and convex, αi∆R(x+ 1) ≥ αi∆R(x) we have
∆V iT−1(x) = −cij + αiδEj[R(x+ 1 + ξ)] + cj − αiδEj[R(x+ ξ)]
= αiδ[pj∆R(x+ 1) + (1− pj)∆R(x)]
≥ αiδ[pj∆R(x) + (1− pj)∆R(x)] ≥ ∆V iT (x)
Next for any t < T − 1, suppose ∆V it+1(x) ≥ ∆V it+2(x).
∆Vt(x) = −cj + αiδ [Ej[Vt+1(x+ 1 + ξ)] + cj − Ej[Vt+1(x+ ξ)]]
= αiδ[pj∆V
i
t+1(x+ 1) + (1− pj)∆V it+1(x)]
≥ αiδ[pj∆V it+2(x+ 1) + δ(1− pj)∆V it+2(x)] ≥ ∆V it+1(x)
in which the inequality follows by induction hypothesis. This completes the in-
duction step.
Lemma 4.13. εRSt (x) 6= High for x < xRSH for all t. If αp(c`H−c`Lp) < α`(cpH−cpL`),
εRST−1(x) = Low
`.
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Proof. When αp(c`H − c`Lp) < α`(cpH − cpL`), θRSL`H > θRSLpH , i.e. min{θRSLpH , θRSL`H} =
θRSLpH . According to the decision rules, if ∆R(x) ≥ θRSLpH , εRSt (x) = Low`, for all x ≥
xRSH . Since R(x) is decreasing and convex in x, ∆R(x) has increasing differences
with x and there exists a threshold xRSL for which ∆R(x) ≥ max{θRSLpH , θRSL`H}, for
all x ≥ xRSL , providers are indifferent between Lowp and Low`. When multiple
working modes are possible, we assume the healthcare leader will determine which
mode will be selected. Specifically, we assume the healthcare leader will choose
Low`. θRS
L`H
x ≥ xRSH , εRSt (x) = Low`. We will assume the healthcare leader will
prefer Low` when multiple equilibria exists.
Lemma 4.14. εRSt (x) 6= High for x ≥ xRSH for all t, if αp(c`H−c`Lp) ≥ α`(cpH−cpL`),
εRST−1(x) = Low
p for all xRSH < x < x
RS
L .
Proof. When αp(c`H − c`Lp) ≥ α`(cpH − cpL`), min{θRSLpH , θRSL`H} = θRSL`H . Therefore,
εRST−1 = Low
p for xRSH ≤ x ≤ xRSL and εRST−1 = Low` and for x > xRSL , εRSt =
Lowp.
For any x < xRSH , we will define τ
RS
H := min{t ∈ T |εRSt (x) = High}, if there
exists such a t that for both players ∆V it+1(x) ≤ αiθRSLiH ; otherwise, τRSH (x) = T .
For any x < xRSH , we will define τ
RS
L (x) := max{t ∈ T |εRSt (x) = Low`}, i.e.
∆V pt+1(x) ≥ αpθRSLpH if there exists such a t ; otherwise, τRSL (x) = x− 1.
Lemma 4.15. for all x ≤ xRSH , there exists a time threshold τRSH (x) nondecreasing
in x, such that εRSt (x) = High for all τ
RS
H (x) < t < T .
Proof. Using lemma 4.12, which describes the nonincreasing differences for ∆V it (x),
i.e. ∆V it (x) ≥ ∆V it+1(x) for each x. By comparing the value functions, if ∆V it (x) ≤
αiθRSLiH for both players i ∈ {p, `} the optimal working mode εRSt = High. The
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nonincreasing differences for ∆V it (x) assures there exists a time threshold τ
RS
H (x)
for which ∆V it (x) = α
iθRSLiH . Hence by lemma 4.12, ∆V
i
t (x) ≤ αiθRSLiH will hold for
τH(x) < t < T , i.e. εRSt = High for all τ
RS
H (x) < t < T .
Lemma 4.16. if αp(c`H − c`Lp) ≥ α`(cpH − cpL`), there exists a time threshold
τRSL (x) < τ
RS
H (x), such that ε
RS
t (x) = Low
p for all τRSL (x) ≤ t ≤ τRSH (x) and
εRSt (x) = Low
` for all x ≤ t ≤ τRSL (x).
Proof. When αp(c`H − c`Lp) ≥ α`(cpH − cpL`), min{θRSLpH , θRSL`H} = θRSL`H . Therefore,
εRST−1(x) = Low
` for all x > xRSL and ε
RS
T−1(x) = Low
p for all xRSH ≤ x ≤ xRSL . Using
lemma 4.19 and ∆V it (x) ≥ ∆V it+1(x) for each x, and by definition for τRSL (x)
and by lemma 4.9 if there exist a time threshold for which ∆V pt+1(x) ≥ αpθRSLpH ,
εRSt (x) = Low
` for all t ≤ τRSL (x). By lemmas 4.9, 4.11, and 4.15 and definitions
for τRSH (x) and τ
RS
L (x), ε
RS
t (x) = High for all τ
RS
H (x) < t < T and ε
RS
t (x) = Low
p
for τRSL ≤ t ≤ τRSH .
Proof of Proposition 4.2.
i. This proof uses lemma 4.8, since the definition for x > xRSL assures that
∆R(x) ≥ θRSLpH and ∆R(x) ≥ θRSL`H . There are multiple equilibria, however, we
assume the healthcare leader is going to make the call in this situation when
both Lowp and Low` working modes are possible. The healthcare leader will
be the one who exerts high effort and therefore, outcome is Low`.
ii. for all xRSH < x < x
RS
L
a. the working outcome follows from equations (4.10) and (4.11) and is shown
in lemma 4.13.
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b. the working outcome follows from equations (4.10) and (4.11) and is shown
in lemma 4.14.
iii. This is shown in lemma 4.10.
iv. This is shown in lemma 4.15.
a. if αp(c`H−c`Lp) < α`(cpH−cpL`), εRST−1(x) = Low` for all x ≥ xRSH . The details
are shown in lemma 4.13.
b. This is the result of lemmas 4.13, 4.15, and 4.16.
4.A.3 Noncontractible Reward
To determine the working mode, the provider will compare his value function in
each of the working modes, High, Low`, Lowp, and Stop. At any t < T − 1 the
healthcare provider will choose Low` over High if and only if
δ∆V pt+1(x) + ∆dt(x) ≥ θ(R)
p
LH (4.25)
Since cpLp > c
p
L`
, θ
(R)p
LH ≥ c
p
H−cpLp
(pH−pL) . Therefore, if the working mode Low
` dom-
inates High, working mode Lowp will dominate High as well. As a result, we do
not need to compare working modes Lowp and High for the provider.
This means that the expected change in the provider’s benefits if they choose
Low` over High, ∆dT−1(x)(pH − pL), will not exceed their instant cost savings
cpH − cpL` , i.e. ∆dT−1(x)(pH − pL) ≤ cpH − cpL` . To see this, note that pH − pL is
negative.
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Next, we will compare the value function for the leader. At any t < T − 1 the
healthcare provider will choose Lowp over High if and only if
δ∆V `t+1(x)−∆dt(x) ≥ θ(R)
`
LH (4.26)
Since dt(x) is decreasing and convex, ∆dt(x) has increasing differences with x.
As a result, −dt(x) is increasing and concave
Lemma 4.17. For all x < xRH , ε
R
T−1(x) = High.
Proof. For any x < xRH , by definition and by increasing differences of ∆R(x)
and ∆dt(x) with x we have ∆R(x) ≤ ∆R(xRH) ≤ θ(R)
`
LH , i.e. V
`
T−1(x|High) >
V `T−1(x|Lowp). Finally, ∆dT−1(x) ≤ ∆dT−1(xRH − 1) ≤ θ(R)
p
LH , V
p
T−1(x|High) >
V pT−1(x|Low`).
Lemma 4.18. For all t and all x, V pt (x|Lowp) > V pt (x|Stop).
Proof. V pt (x|Stop) = −kp, since Ej
[
dt(x+ ξ) + δV
p
t+1(x+ ξ)
] ≥ 0 and f ≥ cpj , the
value function for working mode Lowp is always nonnegative and thus V pt (x|Lowp) ≥
V pt (x|Stop), i.e. εRt (x) 6= Stop.
Since the healthcare provider prefers to exert high effort individually, the part-
nership will never stop.
Lemma 4.19. For any x, ∆V pt (x) has nondecreasing differences in t, i.e. ∆V
p
t (x) ≤
∆V pt+1(x).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on t. We will show the proof for εRt (x) =
εRt (x + 1) = High. The same proof holds when ε
R
t (x) = ε
R
t (x + 1) = Low
i and
when εRt (x) = High, ε
R
t (x + 1) = Low
i. Start from period T − 1, ∆V pT−1(x) =
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−cpH + f + EH [dT−1(x + 1 + ξ) + δV pT (x + 1 + ξ)] + cpH − f − EH [dT−1(x + ξ) +
δV pT (x+ ξ)] = pH∆dT−1(x+ 1) + (1− pH)∆dT−1(x). Since both ∆dT−1(x+ 1) ≤ 0
and ∆dT−1(x) ≤ 0, ∆V pT−1(x) ≤ ∆V pT (x) = 0.
Next, for any t < T−1, ∆V pt (x) = −cpH+f+EH [dt(x+1+ξ)+δV pt+1(x+1+ξ)]+
cpH−f−EH [dt(x+ξ)+δV pt+1(x+ξ)] = pH∆dt(x+1)+(1−pH)∆dt(x)+δpH∆V pt+1(x+
1) + δ(1 − pH)∆V pt+1(x). Suppose ∆V pt+1(x) ≤ ∆V pt+2(x) and ∆dt(x) ≤ ∆dt+1(x).
Hence, ∆V pt (x) = pH∆dt(x + 1) + (1 − pH)∆dt(x) + δpH∆V pt+1(x + 1) + δ(1 −
pH)∆V
p
t+1(x) ≤ pH∆dt+1(x + 1) + (1 − pH)∆dt+1(x) + δpH∆V pt+2(x + 1) + δ(1 −
pH)∆V
p
t+2(x) = ∆V
p
t+1(x). ∆V
p
t (x) ≤ ∆V pt+1(x). This completes the induction.
Lemma 4.20. For any x, ∆V `t (x) has nonincreasing differences in t, i.e. ∆V
`
t (x) ≥
∆V `t+1(x).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on t. We will show the proof for εRt (x) =
εRt (x + 1) = High. The same proof holds when ε
R
t (x) = ε
R
t (x + 1) = Low
i and
when εRt (x) = High, ε
R
t (x + 1) = Low
i. Start from period T − 1, ∆V `T−1(x) =
−c`H − f +EH [−dT−1(x+ 1 + ξ) + δV `T (x+ 1 + ξ)] + c`H + f −EH [−dT−1(x+ ξ) +
δV `T (x+ ξ)] = −pH∆dT−1(x+1)− (1−pH)∆dT−1(x)+pHR(x+1)+(1−pH)R(x).
Since both −∆dT−1(x+1) ≥ 0 and −∆dT−1(x) ≥ 0, ∆V `T−1(x) ≥ ∆V `T (x) = R(x).
Next, for any t < T −1, ∆V `t (x) = −c`H−f+EH [−dt(x+1+ξ)+δV `t+1(x+1+
ξ)] + cpH + f −EH [−dt(x+ ξ) + δV `t+1(x+ ξ)] = −pH∆dt(x+ 1)− (1− pH)∆dt(x) +
pH∆V
`
t+1(x+1)+(1−pH)∆V `t+1(x). Suppose ∆V `t+1(x) ≥ ∆V `t+2(x) and −∆dt(x) ≥
−∆dt+1(x). Hence, ∆V `t (x) = −pH∆dt(x + 1) − (1 − pH)∆dt(x) + pH∆V `t+1(x +
1) + (1 − pH)∆V `t+1(x) ≥ −pH∆dt+1(x + 1) − (1 − pH)∆dt+1(x) + pH∆V `t+2(x +
1) + (1 − pH)∆V `t+2(x) = ∆V `t+1(x). ∆V `t (x) ≥ ∆V `t+1(x). This completes the
induction.
Lemma 4.21. If εRt+1(x+ 1) = ε
R
t+1(x) = Low
p, then εRt (x) = Low
p.
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Proof. εRt (x) = Low
p if (i) V `t (x|lowp) > V `t (x|High), i.e. δ∆V `t+1(x) −∆dt(x) ≥
θ
(R)`
LH and (ii) V
p
t (x|Lowp) > V pt (x|Stop),
(i) when εRt+1(x + 1) = ε
R
t+1(x) = Low
p, δ∆V `t+2(x + 1) − dt+1(x + 1) ≥ θ(R)
`
LH
and ∆V `t+2(x) − dt+1(x) ≥ θ(R)
`
LH . Since ∆V
`
t+1(x) = V
`
t+1(x + 1) − V `t+1(x),
∆V `t+1(x) = −c`Lp − f + EL[−dt+1(x+ 1 + ξ) + δV `t+2(x+ 1 + ξ) + c`Lp + f −
EL[−dt+1(x + ξ) + δV `t+2(x + ξ)] = pL[−∆dt+1(x + 1) + δ∆V `t+2(x + 1)] +
(1 − pL)[−∆dt+1(x) + δ∆V `t+2(x)] ≥ pLθ(R)
`
LH + (1 − pL)θ(R)
`
LH = θ
(R)`
LH . Hence,
−∆dt(x) + δ∆V `t+1(x) ≥ ∆V `t+1(x) ≥ θ(R)
`
LH .
(ii) by lemma 4.18, for all t and x, V pt (x|Lowp) > V pt (x|Stop).
We denote, for any t, the highest state where ε
(R)`
t (x) = High, as
x
(R)`
H,t = max
{
x ∈ Z+|δ∆V `t+1(x)−∆dt(x) ≤ θ(R)
`
LH
}
(4.27)
Lemma 4.22. For any t, x
(R)`
H,t is nondecreasing in t, i.e. x
(R)`
H,t ≤ x(R)
`
H,t+1.
Proof. By definition, ε
(R)`
t (x) 6= High for all x > x(R)
`
H,t . Suppose by contradiction
that x
(R)`
H,t > x
(R)`
H,t+1 for some t. Then, there must exist some x, x
(R)`
H,t ≥ x > x(R)
`
H,t+1,
such that ε
(R)`
t (x) = High and ε
(R)`
t+1 (x) = Low. If ε
(R)`
t+1 (x + 1) = Low and
ε
(R)`
t+1 (x) = Low by lemma 4.21, we should then have had ε
(R)`
t (x) = Low, a
contradiction.
Lemma 4.23. If ε
(R)p
t+1 (x+ 1) = ε
(R)p
t+1 (x) = High, then ε
(R)p
t (x) = High.
Proof. εRt (x) = High if V
p
t (x|High) > V pt (x|low`), i.e. δ∆V pt+1(x) + ∆dt(x) ≤
θ
(R)p
LH . When ε
R
t+1(x + 1) = ε
R
t+1(x) = High, δ∆V
p
t+2(x + 1) + ∆dt+1(x) ≤ θ(R)
p
LH
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and δ∆V pt+2(x) + ∆dt+1(x) ≤ θ(R)
p
LH . Since ∆V
p
t+1(x) = V
p
t+1(x + 1) − V pt+1(x),
∆V pt+1(x) = −cpH+f+EH [dt+1(x+1+ξ)+δVt+2(x+1+ξ)+cpH−f−EH [dt+1(x+ξ)+
δVt+2(x+ξ)] = pH [∆dt+1(x+1)+δ∆Vt+2(x+1)]+(1−pH)[∆dt+1(x)+δ∆Vt+2(x)] ≤
pHθ
(R)p
LH + (1− pH)θ(R)
p
LH = θ
(R)p
LH . As a result, ∆V
p
t+1(x) ≤ θ(R)
p
LH . Since ∆dt(x) < 0,
δ∆V pt+1(x) + ∆dt(x) ≤ θ(R)
p
LH , i.e. ε
(R)p
t (x) = High.
We denote, for any t, the highest state where ε
(R)p
t (x) = High, as
x
(R)p
H,t = max
{
x ∈ Z+|δ∆V pt+1(x) + ∆dt(x) ≤ θ(R)
p
LH
}
(4.28)
Lemma 4.24. For any t, x
(R)p
H,t is nonincreasing in t, i.e. x
(R)p
H,t ≥ x(R)
p
H,t+1.
Proof. Since ∆V pt (x) is nondecreasing by lemma 4.19 and by definition, ε
(R)p
t (x) 6=
High for all x > x
(R)p
H,t . Suppose by contradiction that x
(R)p
H,t < x
(R)p
H,t+1 for some t.
Then, there must exist some x, x
(R)`
H,t < x ≤ x(R)
`
H,t+1, such that ε
(R)`
t (x) = Low.
By decreasing differences of ∆V pt+1(x) + ∆dt(x) in t, ε
(R)`
t+1 (x) = Low. Which by
definition means that ε
(R)`
t+1 (x+ 1) = Low, a contradiction.
For the sake of mathematical brevity, we will denote the optimal policy in
state x and time t for the provider in the relational contract with ε
(R)p
t (x) and the
optimal policy in state x and time t for the healthcare leader with ε
(R)`
t (x).
Lemma 4.25. For all t and all x < x
(R)p
H , ε
(R)p
t (x) = High.
Proof. By lemma 4.19, ∆V pt (x) is nondecreasing in t. Furthermore, ∆dt+1 ≥
∆dt(x). As a result, δ∆V
p
t (x)+∆dt−1(x) ≤ δ∆V pt+1(x)+∆dt(x). Since δ∆V pt+1(x)+
∆dt(x) ≤ θ(R)
p
LH holds for period t, it will hold for period t−1 as well, i.e. δ∆V pt (x)+
∆dt−1(x) ≤ θ(R)
p
LH .
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Lemma 4.26. For all x > xRL , ε
R
t (x) = Low
i.
Proof. By definition for xRL , ε
R
T−1(x) = Low
i for all x > xRL . The proof for t < T−1
follows from lemma 4.21 and the definition for xRL .
For each state x < xRL , let us define
τ¯(x) := {t ∈ T |δ∆V pt+1(x) + ∆dt(x) ≥ θ(R)
p
LH }
τ
¯
(x) := {t ∈ T |δ∆V `t+1(x)−∆dt(x) ≥ θ(R)
`
LH }
if there exists such a t, otherwise τ
¯
(x) = x and τ¯(x) = T
Lemma 4.27. For all x < xRL , there exists a time threshold τ¯
(x), nondecreasing
in x, such that ε
(R)`
t (x) = Low
p for all x ≤ t ≤ τ
¯
(x) and ε
(R)`
t (x) = High for
τ
¯
(x) < t < T .
Proof. This proof uses lemmas 4.20, 4.21, and 4.22. Recall, the highest state where
the healthcare leader prefers working mode High is x
(R)`
H,t and is nondecreasing in
t, i.e. x
(R)`
H,t ≤ x(R)
`
H,t+1. As a result, if there exists such a time threshold τ¯
(x), it is
optimal for the healthcare leader to work in High mode for periods t > τ
¯
(x). Fix
x > x
(R)`
H,t , by definition we have ε
R
t (x) 6= High. By lemma 4.21 and nonincreasing
differences in ∆V `t (x), if ε
R
t (x) = Low
p, then εRt−1(x) = Low
p. Hence, for all
t ≤ τ
¯
(x), εRt (x) = Low
p. Furthermore, since x
(R)`
H,t is nondecreasing in t, τ¯
(x) is
nondecreasing in x as well.
Lemma 4.28. For all x < xRL , there exists a time threshold τ¯(x), nonincreasing
in x, such that ε
(R)p
t (x) = High for all x ≤ t ≤ τ¯(x) and ε(R)
p
t (x) = Low
` for
τ¯(x) < t < T .
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Proof. This proof uses lemmas 4.19, 4.23, and 4.24. By definition, the highest state
the healthcare provider prefers working mode High is x
(R)p
H,t . Since ∆V
p
t+1(x) +
∆dt(x) has nondecreasing differences in t, if there exists such a time threshold
τ¯(x), it is optimal for the healthcare provider to work in Low` mode for t > τ¯(x).
Furthermore, by lemma 4.23 if ε
(R)p
t+1 (x) = High then ε
(R)p
t (x) = High. Hence, for
all t ≤ τ¯(x), ε(R)p = High. Because x(R)pH,t is nonincreasing in t, i.e. x(R)
p
H,t ≥ x(R)
p
H,t+1,
τ¯(x) will be nonincreasing in x.
Lemma 4.29. For all x < xRL , there exists time periods τ¯
(x) and τ¯(x) such that
εRt (x) = Low
p for t < τ
¯
(x), εRt (x) = High for τ¯
(x) ≤ t ≤ τ¯(x), and εRt (x) = Low`
for τ¯(x) < t < T .
Proof. This lemma follows from lemmas 4.27 and 4.28.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
Chapter 2 studied the effects of current payment mechanisms including fee-for-
service, capitation, and performance-based on the objectives of value-based health-
care delivery reform. Specifically, conditions under which the providers would be
encouraged to simultaneously integrate the care and provide high quality treat-
ments was determined. The results suggest that a performance-based payment
scheme can achieve similar results to the first-best solution. The providers will be
encouraged to provide high-quality, integrated care if the health benefits of care
outweighs the total costs of care. Since the performance-based payment system
is based on benefits of the health outcomes, its applicability depends on the mea-
surability and contractability of health outcomes. Contracts like capitation can
induce integration or cost reduction incentives; however, can also result in min-
imum quality provision. Contracts like fee-for-service can support high quality
treatments but may not result in lower costs. As a result, fee-for-service is not an
efficient way of achieving high quality treatments. The capitation payment system
can be modified to include the possibility of complications. When the purchaser
holds the providers accountable for the avoidable complications, providers can be
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motivated to provide high quality service and integrate the care. When low qual-
ity provision results in higher expected costs of complication, capitation with full
accountability can outperform other contracts. The second chapter analytically
evaluates the consequences of current payment schemes on the healthcare delivery
structures and evaluating their merit in fulfilling value-based delivery objectives.
Chapter 3 examined the coordinating contracts between the healthcare pur-
chaser and the IPU in the context of value-based healthcare delivery. Coordinating
contracts allow the IPU to optimize its objective while maximizing the societal
welfare. The problem of hidden action, in which the IPU’s treatment strategy is
unverifiable to the purchaser, was considered.
Since the IPU’s treatment strategy stochastically affects the health outcomes
over time, the optimal contract should consider the health outcomes over the
care cycle and evaluate the IPU based on that. To capture the dynamics of health
outcomes over the care cycle a continuous-time dynamic principal-agent model was
used to derive the optimal contract. The analysis suggests that, in order to prevent
healthcare failures, compensation policies should be contingent on the accumulated
performance. The concept of continuation value was devised to summarize the
IPU’s track record. Continuation value includes all the information from IPU’s
performance and can then be used to determine the payments to the IPU. The
resulting compensation scheme includes a certain credit limit for each patient plus
bonus payments for accumulated good performance. Good performance results in
positive money transfers, and failures reduces the compensation.
Results of chapter 3 contributes to the literature of healthcare contracting in
several ways. First and foremost, it closes the gap in designing a dynamic incentive
contract in the healthcare delivery context. Current payment systems like fee-for-
service reimburse the providers for discrete services and can encourage providers
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to overprovide services. To add value for the patients, the providers should eval-
uate if the additional test or treatment can create better health outcomes and
can result in better health in future. A payment system like capitation can con-
trol the increasing healthcare expenditures, but might incentivize the providers
to underprovide services or select the healthy patients that will require less care.
Characterization of the optimal contract in this research summarizes the IPU’s
performance with one single variable, which in turn enables the implementation
of the optimal contract. This is a significant contribution because most of the
existing payment systems that link the payment to the performance pay for ful-
filling some targeted processes. Paying for processes might not result in better
health outcomes. The payment scheme introduced in the third chapter pays for
the health outcome while holding the IPU accountable for the health outcomes.
Second, this research mathematically demonstrates the optimal payment sys-
tem in the value-based delivery context. Michael Porter argues that a bundled
payment should coordinate the healthcare purchaser-IPU relationship [34]. Bun-
dled payment reimburses providers with a fixed fee for for delivering all the services
required to deliver a complete cycle of patient care for a specific clinical condition.
Nonetheless, the results of this research suggest that other than the bundled pay-
ment, the IPU should be compensated with a bonus when they achieve superior
performance. Basically, the payment to the IPU should be adjusted based on the
health outcomes.
Third, the technique of characterization of the optimal contract in this research
can arguably result in a straightforward implementation. The use of a continuous-
time principal-agent model helped us to characterize the problem with minimal
assumptions and devised us with a great technical tool to summarize the IPU’s
track during the care cycle. Cost-reducing efforts and value-adding treatments
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increase the IPU’s continuation value, which can eventually result in bonus pay-
ments if they exceed a certain threshold for the continuation value. Thus, the
proposed payment scheme can fulfill the tenets of value-based healthcare delivery
by acting as the source of incentive for the IPU to improve the health outcomes
and minimize the costs at the same time.
Chapter 4 studied how different contractual arrangements affect the collabo-
ration dynamics among the IPU members in treating a patient over a finite time
horizon. The analysis shows it is optimal for the providers to work in collaboration
when patient is not suffering from consecutive complications. The more successful
the IPU has been in sustaining the health for a patient, the more likely they will
collaborate in the future periods. When successful, IPU members want to keep
the failures to a minimum and therefore would provide high quality treatments,
whereas when the number of failures increases, the IPU members would prefer
low quality treatments sooner. When the efforts are not contractible, the collab-
oration dynamics depend on the type of contract. Two types of hybrid contracts
were studied in this chapter; first, a capitation with a reward-sharing contract and
second, a combination of formal and informal contracts. A capitation payment, in
hand with a reward-sharing contract, creates similar results to the first-best solu-
tion, but, to implement this type of contract the rewards should be contractible.
The relational contracts was used to evaluate the collaboration dynamics when
rewards are noncontractible. This type of contracts have a formal, court-enforced,
component. In the IPU, the provider will be paid a fixed-amount no matter what
the health outcomes are. Relational contracts also have a discretionary payment
component. A general form of discretionary payment was considered in this re-
search, which is decreasing with the number of failures. The results demonstrate
that the provider is encouraged to work in collaboration sooner than the leader.
Conclusions 124
The provider’s incentive stems from the discretionary payment at the end of each
period. Nevertheless, the healthcare leader and IPU’s performance will be assessed
at the end of disease cycle. The results show that in some periods relational con-
tracts can achieve better results than the reward-sharing contracts. This study
is the first to characterize the collaboration dynamics among the providers in the
value-based healthcare delivery.
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